Virginia Injury Attorney Blog

In Gagnon v. Burns, No. 049352 in Gloucester Circuit Court, the brain injury victim alleges gross negligence as an exception to the sovereign immunity claimed by the defendant Assistant Principal. Plaintiffs allege that his failure to exercise any prudence, diligence or care for the safety of the student constitutes gross negligence as a matter of law.

“Gross negligence” is “that degree of negligence which shows indifference to others as constitutes an utter disregard of prudence amounting to a complete neglect of the safety of [another].” Koffman v. Garnett, 265 Va. 12, 15 (2003). “A claim of gross negligence, which involves the ‘absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care,’ will not lie if the defendant exercised some degree of care with regard to the plaintiff. Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 133, 400 S.E. 2d 184, 189 (1991).” Whitley v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 490 (2000). Jennings v. Hart, 602 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 n.6 (W.D. Va. 2009)(Virginia law).

Thus, the Court in Colby held there was no gross negligence where the trial court found defendant “exercised ‘some degree’ of care for the safety of others.” 241 Va. at 133 (emphasis added). Likewise in Whitley there was no gross negligence where the trial court’s “findings show that defendants exercised at least some degree of care” toward the victim. 260 Va. at 490.

Conversely in Jennings, however, the Court ruled defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity for “any alleged acts of negligence [gross or simple]” based on defendants having showed no degree of care for the victim. 602 F. Supp. 2d at 759 (emphasis added). “Holding otherwise would imply that [defendants] have complete discretion to ignore… and disregard….” Id. (denying sovereign immunity on Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

Moreover, the case cited by Gloucester Circuit Court at hearing on December 16, 2009, B.M.H. v. The School Board of the City of Chesapeake, Virginia, 833 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1993)(Virginia law), supports Plaintiffs’ position too. In B.M.H., school teachers “failed to take action [about a threat…] even though they had stated an intention to do so”; and this allegation alone sufficed to support the claim of gross negligence. Id. at 562, 574.

POST 12/30 Attorneys Forum, Brain Injuries

In the brain injury case of Gagnon v. Burns, No. CL07-557-00 in Gloucester, Virginia, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s conduct in destroying evidence and approaching witnesses should be considered some evidence of gross negligence. The Virginia Supreme Court has declared that “a party’s conduct, ‘so far as it indicates his own belief in the weakness of his cause,’ is admissible as an admission against interest.” Gray v. Graham, 231 Va. 1, 9-10 (1986)(avoidance of being photographed). Such “acts or conduct of a party may be admitted into evidence, because they show a ‘consciousness of guilt’ and thus constitute, in effect, an admission by conduct. Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, §18-49(9)(1)(6th ed. 2003).” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 70 Va. Cir. 341, 343 (Portsmouth Mar. 29, 2006)(subsequent imposing statements to a prospective witness).

On December 18, 2009, The Daily Press again marqueed Hampton Roads attorney, Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., under a headline entitled, “Judge says assistant principal negligent.” Mr. Waterman prevailed in a brain injury case in Gloucester Circuit Court, Gagnon v. Burns, No. CL08-572.

The article reports the witnesses’ testimony and judge’s ruling adverse to the Defendant Assistant Principal in this special case. It also notes that Defendant Burns has $6,000,000.00 of insurance coverage in Gagnon.

On December 16, 2009, Gloucester Circuit Court heard the Demurrer and the Plea in Bar of Virginia sovereign immunity in the brain injury case of Gagnon v. Burns, No.
CL08-572. At 9:15 p.m., after a 12-hour trial, Judge Long ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, who are represented by Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq.

The only witnesses Defendant Burns called in this special case besides himself were his self-interested co-Defendants: James Newsome, the admitted attacker who was prosecuted criminally for his offense against the victim; and his sister, Christine Newsome, who at least one witness says egged on her brother to punch the victim, Greg Gagnon. The self-serving accounts of the Newsomes about a supposedly demeaning profane remark being made by the victim were refuted by a non-party witness for Plaintiffs, fellow student eyewitness, Ronnie Miller; and by James Newsome’s own contemporaneous signed statement admitted into evidence, which showed no such remark at all.

Conversely, Plaintiffs called 10 witnesses on their behalf, mostly non-parties. Five witnesses testified that in Gagnon Assistant Principal Burns at Gloucester High School (“GHS”) admitted his fault to each of them independently in strong terms shortly after the attack. Former student Shannon Diaz testified Burns “apologized for dropping the ball”. Gloucester County Deputy Carwell testified Burns admitted, “I screwed up.” Gloucester County Sergeant Shuster testified Burns admitted, “I made a big mistake. I thought I had told you guys about it.” The brain injury victim’s father testified Burns admitted, “I feel I owe you an apology because I ‘dropped the ball’. I could have done something to stop this but didn’t.” The victim’s mother testified Burns admitted, “I know that you know that I talked to Shannon Diaz, and I am very sorry because I dropped the ball.”

Further, Burns admitted in Gagnon that he disposed of his handwritten note about his meeting with Diaz and his school calendar for the day of the attack. Plaintiffs asserted that was contemporaneous evidence spoliation in the special case.

In closing, Mr. Waterman stressed that Burns simply had failed to perform a “ministerial act,” i.e., a “no-brainer” (requiring no real discretion). He analogized that Burns ignoring the warning and brain injury following was like an Emergency Room doctor failing to address chest pains as a potential heart attack and instead wrongfully blowing them off summarily as only indigestion.

The Gloucester Court in Gagnon sat as trier of fact without a jury, including as to the issues of negligence of Burns; as requested by Defendant and Plaintiffs. The Court believed that the most persuasive authority was B.M.H. v. The School Board of the City of Chesapeake, Virginia, 833 F.Supp. 560 (E.D.Va. 1993)(Virginia law), and applied the four-factor test of Virginia sovereign immunity enunciated in Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301 (1984), relied upon therein. In this special case, only the test’s fourth prong was in issue: whether the act was discretionary or ministerial and whether there was any gross or simple negligence.

The Gagnon Court expressly found the testimony of Diaz and other witnesses of Plaintiffs more credible than the testimony of Burns and his Co-Defendant witnesses; found that the act of notifying GHS Security of the reported impending physical altercation omitted by Burns was a ministerial act; found that Burns was guilty of simple negligence, but not gross negligence, in the non-performance of that ministerial act; and found that the aforesaid findings are dispositive and preclusive as to the liability of Burns to Plaintiffs on the Amended Complaint. The Court overruled the Demurrer; denied the Plea in Bar; and ordered that Plaintiffs’ cause against Burns be set for separate trial forthwith only on the amount of damages for the brain injury as the sole remaining issue.

The Court denied Burns’ oral post-trial motion to strike the de bene esse deposition in this special case, which deposition was taken in the non-suited predecessor suit of a witness unavailable for this trial, Diaz. Burns participated in that companion suit deposition through his same counsel of record as in Gagnon.

Fortunately for Burns, as Assistant Principal at GHS, he enjoys $6,000,000.00 of liability insurance coverage for negligence in Gagnon. He is covered by a $1,000,000.00 liability policy, plus a $5,000,000.00 excess policy, for Gagnon’s brain injury.

On November 17, 2009, Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. filed a wrongful death suit in Richmond Circuit Court. Defendants are a Trooper and the Superintendant of the Virginia State Police.

The alleged wrongful death occurred when at least one Trooper fatally shot multiple times at close range a motorist who was trying to flee an interstate stop and arrest in Stafford County, Virginia.

Permissive Court venue is based on at least one Defendant having his place of business in Richmond. Plaintiff predicates his wrongful death claims under Virginia statute, including the Virginia Tort Claims Act; and under federal statute, including Section 1983 violation of civil rights for excessive use of deadly force.

On December 10, 2009, the Chief Judge of Hampton Circuit Court entered Contempt Order against Ricky E. Carr after supplemental hearing for reconsideration at his request. In the special case of Carr v. Carr, No. 05-378, Mr. Carr was ordered to pay in full arrearages of $40,318.85 by February 26, 2010, under penalty of serving 10 days in jail, being fined $250.00, and still having to pay his arrearages.

The week before hearing in Carr, Mr. Carr interposed the following in a vain attempt to avoid entry of the Order: Notice to Strike, Amended Notice to Strike, two Motions to Quash, and Notice and Motion to Show Cause. Moreover, at hearing of his special case, Mr. Carr unsuccessfully sought to claim credit for $24,000.00 of attorney fees that he actually had not paid!

On December 9, 2009, Mr. Waterman obtained confidential settlement of a sexual abuse case. It resolved the Federal civil lawsuit of Zaruba v. Brooks, No. 4:09cv86 in the Newport News Division of United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

The sexual abuse victim in Zaruba sued for being molested as a child. The Defendant previously had pleaded guilty criminally to the reduced offense of “aggravated sexual battery”.

The victim having a criminal guilty plea by the accused is invaluable to a successful civil suit. Otherwise, the sexual abuse alleged stands to be a hotly disputed core issue at civil trial.