Virginia Injury Attorney Blog

As recent Virginia Supreme Court case pronounced “a medical doctor is qualified to give expert testimony about the cause of human physical injury.” Hollingsworth v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 279 Va. 360, 364 (2010)(emphasis added). “Code §8.01-581.20 addresses only the qualifications of experts to testify on the standard of care and whether the standard of care is breached in a medical malpractice case. The requirements do not address whether an expert witness is qualified to testify on proximate causation.” Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by holding that Dr. Corkill was not qualified to testify on proximate causation…” Lloyd v. Kime, 275 Va. 98, 112 (2008)(citation omitted)(emphasis added).

“[B]y the great weight of authority, a physician or surgeon is not incompetent to testify as an expert merely because he is not a specialist in the particular branch of his profession involved in the case; although this fact may be considered as affecting the weight of his testimony.” Butler v. Greenwood, 180 Va. 456, 462 (1942)(emphasis added)(“orthopedic surgeon of Richmond, Virginia, was permitted to answer a hypothetical question touching the brain condition of Mr. Greenwood,” who “was under the care of another doctor”).

“[T]he fact that Dr. Rodman [a ‘family’ physician’ treating some patients with heart ailments,] is not a cardiologist’ or cardiothoracic surgeon does not prevent him from giving an expert opinion on this issue [whether the vehicle collision caused the heart attack]. The fact that Dr. Redman may not be a member of one of these specialties only goes to the weight which the trier of fact may place on his testimony.” Thomas v. Builders Transp., Inc., 28 Va. Cir. 93, 95 (Amherst Apr. 3, 1992)(emphasis added).

Defendant in another medical malpractice case “argues that since Dr. Hall is a general surgeon and is not a radiologist or a pathologist, his opinion [that Defendant’s ‘negligence was a proximate cause of Burke’s death’] rested on mere conjecture and improperly was based on subjects on which he was not qualified to offer an expert opinion. We disagree.” Lo v. Burke, 249 Va. 311, 318 (1995) (emphasis added). “In reaching this conclusion, we reject Dr. Lo’s argument that Dr. Hall improperly was allowed to offer opinion testimony on subjects involving radiology and pathology. Dr. Hall testified that while he is not qualified to examine pathology slides or read radiography films, the duties of a general surgeon include the review of reports of all the medical specialists involved in a case. * * * Therefore, we conclude that Dr. Hall’s evaluation of pathology and radiology reports in formulating his expert opinion did not constitute improper opinion testimony.” Id. (emphasis added).

“Dr. Zimmerman testified that he regularly reviews CT scans, X-ray films, and other tests in evaluating tissue samples for the presence of disease. He explained that, although he has not had formal training in radiology and does not consider himself an expert in that field, he is able to read and interpret CT scans. Dr. Zimmerman further stated that, if he is unable to read a CT scan, he consults with a radiologist. However, he testified that he was able to read and interpret the CT scans of King’s eye without requesting a radiologist’s opinion. Dr. Zimmerman also indicated that, as a pathologist, he is familiar with the cellular manifestations that are characteristic of Sjogren’s syndrome.” King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71, 78 (1996)(emphasis added). We conclude that the trial court did not err in permitting Dr. Zimmerman’s testimony on these issues, since the evidence showed that he regularly evaluated CT scans in his pathology practice, and that he has skills and experience in recognizing Sjogren’s syndrome. The fact that Dr. Zimmerman did not qualify as an expert in radiology or rheumatology is relevant only to the weight to be given his testimony by the trier of fact.” Id. (citation omitted)(emphasis added).

The Virginia Supreme Court construes Va. Code Ann. §8.01-401.1 strictly, as it is a statute in derogation of the common law against admission of hearsay:

In enacting the 1994 amendments to Code §8.01-401.1, the General Assembly was clearly aware of those dangers and sought to avoid them by inserting two preconditions to the admission of hearsay expert opinions as substantive evidence of direct examination. First, the testifying witness must have ‘relied upon’ the statements contained in the published treatises….

See, Bostic v. About Women OB/GYN, P.C., 275 Va. 567, 576 (2008)(emphasis added)(attached). The Virginia Supreme Court in its Bostic medical malpractice opinion emphasized that “relied upon” means “in forming his opinion,” not “to talk to this jury”:

The statutory standard is not met by an expert’s testimony that he relied upon it only to use ‘to talk to this jury,’ as the testifying witness did in the present case. The statutory term means that the witness must testify that he relied on the article in forming his opinion, which is consistent with the views expressed by the absent author.

Id. at 577 (emphasis added). Bostic follows another medical malpractice decision, May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 361 (2002)(emphasis added), which also speaks in terms of “relied upon” to reach opinion in advance of trial, not just at it: “In that motion [in limine, which was granted and upheld on appeal], he asserted that the executor had failed to identify, as required by Code §8.01-401.1, the specific statements Dr. Waldo had relied upon to reach his opinion….”

Continue reading " Virginia: Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Reliance " »

A Plaintiff once provided Defendants the precise “statements” and citations of his reliable authority more than 30 days before trial in a medical malpractice case. Also, more than 30 days before trial, he gratuitously provided them the full pages of the textbooks and articles in which each of those “statements” appeared.

Va. Code Ann. §8.01-401.1 does not even mention the word “article,” though Defendants still claimed it must be provided. §8.01-401.1 only requires that the discrete specific “statements” relied by a party upon be provided in a medical malpractice suit.

In the medical malpractice trial of May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 361 (2002) (emphasis added), the only authority cited by Defendants, the party “failed to identify, as required by Code 8.01-401.1, the specific statements Dr. Waldo had relied upon to reach his expert opinion.” May simply upheld exclusion for the party failing “to adequately identify the statements,” id. at 363 (emphasis added); it did not hold that the only way to identify statements is to underline/highlight them in an article.

Five years after May, another medical malpractice decision, Budd v. Punyanitya, 273 Va. 583, 588 (2007) (emphasis added), observed that underlining or highlighting is not the only way to adequately identify “statements”. “Budd conceded that he did not provide counsel for Dr. Punyanita with copies of the designated article or otherwise indicate the statement…” Id.

In Healy v. Shegog, No. 00-1249 (Hampton August 2004) (Lerner, J.) and Johnson v. Riverside Hosp., Inc., No. CL002963B-DP c/w No. CL01-30571-DP (Newport News March 2005) (Pugh, J.), Mr. Waterman adequately identified the “statements” simply by providing defendants the typed “statements” with citations. Plaintiffs did not even provide the pages on which the “statements” appeared in those medical malpractice actions, let alone textbooks or articles.

In the medical malpractice case of Johnson v. Riverside Hosp., Inc., No. CL00-29638-DP c/w CL01-30571-DP (Newport News Mar. 7, 2005)(Pugh, J.), defense counsel unsuccessfully objected to Mr. Waterman subpoenaing the corporate Defendant as a trial witness to testify through its most knowledgeable representatives designated by it in discovery. See¸ 3/7/05 Johnson v. Riverside, Final Pre-Trial Order at 2 and 5 (“Plaintiff is entitled to call Defendant through its previously identified Rule 4:5(b)(6) designated representatives” and even new “testimony…outside the scope of the new corporate designation is taken under advisement,” and subsequently was granted at trial). In Johnson, Plaintiff’s first several trial witnesses were Defendant, Riverside Hospital, testifying through its personnel.

“A litigants’ attendance upon the trial may be compelled by the issuance and service upon him of a subpoena …, as is the case with any other witness.” Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 532 (1943). Va. Code Ann. §8.01-407. Of course, common sense dictates it must be so that Plaintiff can subpoena the corporate Defendant to testify at trial; otherwise, Plaintiff would be precluded from calling the corporate Defendant in person to testify ore tenus, and instead would be limited to only a deposition.

Court hearing in the medical malpractice lawsuit of Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in Circuit Court for York County and Town of Poquoson, Virginia, showed there is no dispute that: (1) Defendants never charged Plaintiff anything for the 10/5/06 repair surgery, despite charging him for the other 4 surgeries before and after it [“No-Charge”]; and (2) Defendants wrote off as “bad debt” $1,963.53 of bills for the other 4 surgeries [Write-offs”]. That information comes from Defendants’ office computer and is summarized by Plaintiff. See, Defendants’ Charges/No Charges/Write-offs Composite.

First, Defendants’ counsel previously represented to the Court at prior hearing in Marshall that the 10/5/06 no-charge supposedly was “bundling of services” by Defendants, despite none of the other 4 surgeries having been “bundled” with one another. Moreover, the corporate Defendants’ designated representative, Ms. Schwartzlow, had testified she conferred with and received authorization from Dr. Moniz about Write-Offs, prior to any medical malpractice suit being filed. See, Williamsburg Surgery (by Schwartzlow) Deposition at 63-66.

Second, the two cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable on their facts. Both involve “offers” of compromise or remedial assistance in cases not involving medical malpractice. See, Lewis v. Kim, 46 Va. Cir. 227 (Alexandria Jul. 22, 1998) and Novick v. Dillon, 44 Va. Cir. 111 (Richmond Nov. 24, 1997); But in Marshall, the Write-Offs were unilateral conduct by Defendants.

Third, contrary to Defendants’ representation in Marshall, Richmond Circuit Court actually upholds the admissibility of write-offs, where as here, they are unilateral by Defendants versus “offers” to Plaintiff. In another medical malpractice action of Mr. Waterman, Schuster v. Posner, No. LA-134-3 (Richmond Mar. 24, 1997), Judge Markow ruled that Defendants’ medical bill write-off was admissible against interest, that Defendants were free to try explaining it away, and that “it’s up to the jury to decide who to believe”. See, 3/24/97 Schuster v. Posner Transcript at 75. 11-96.20.

Fourth, the day before hearing in Marshall Defendants inconsistently filed to admit their Write-Offs in evidence to reduce Plaintiff’s medical bills at their medical malpractice trial beginning on March 28, 2011. See, Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine regarding Write-Offs. But it is hornbook law that Defendants cannot approbate and reprobate.

On March 24, 2011, various pre-trial motions again were heard in Circuit Court for York County and the Town of Poquoson, Virginia, in the medical malpractice suit of Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018. The case goes to jury trial at the Yorktown Courthouse during March 28-April 7, 2011.

The Marshall Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Strike Claim based on Surgery for Lack of Causation. Defendants wanted to keep from the jury evidence supporting the medical malpractice allegation that in the face of patient complaints Defendants delayed in seeing and operating on Plaintiff; but the Court ruled Plaintiff was entitled to present that evidence.

The Court in Marshall also denied Defendants’ Motion to Quash Rule 4:5(b)(6) Trial Subpoena of Williamsburg Surgery, P.C. Defendants tried to prohibit Plaintiff from calling corporate Defendant in person at trial through its most knowledgeable persons previously designated in deposition, but the Court ruled that Williamsburg Surgery, P.C. must honor the subpoena and testify at the medical malpractice trial through its representatives.

Additionally, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Reduce Plaintiff’s ad damnum. Defendants unsuccessfully attempted to limit the patients’ medical malpractice suit to $1,850,000.00 instead of the $12,000,000.00 he claimed, but the Court ruled Plaintiff was entitled to maintain and argue for the full amount pleaded in his lawsuit.

Further, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion in Limine concerning Neurology Testimony by Dr. Swartz and Dr. Morgan. That means in the Marshall medical malpractice suit Plaintiff’s general surgeons will not be allowed to corroborate Plaintiff and his neurologist that the patient’s protracted hospitalization and its incidents caused his permanent painful disabling peripheral neuropathy, despite Sr. Swartz and Dr. Morgan having knowledge of and experience with other surgical patients sustaining substantially similar neuropathy from the same cause.

Continue reading " Virginia: Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Pre-Trial " »

On March 25, 2011, additional pre-trial motions were heard in the medical malpractice lawsuit of Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in Circuit Court for York County and the Town of Poquoson, Virginia. Among other things, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion regarding Blog of Plaintiff’s Counsel filed by Jason R. Davis, Esq. and Mary Elizabeth Sherwin, Esq. of Kaufman & Canoles, P.C., a defense-oriented law firm based in Norfolk, Virginia.

Defendants through their counsel sought “during the course of trial to require plaintiff’s counsel to immediately remove all information this case from his website and any other public material, discontinue blogging or otherwise publishing about this case, and deactivate the blog.” Jury trial of the Marshall medical malpractice case on the merits is scheduled for March 28 – April 7, 2011, at the Yorktown Courthouse.

The Marshall Court denied the aggressive Motion of the defense, which is covered by Sentara’a $1,850,000.00 medical malpractice policy, as Sentara has purchased the assets of the corporate Defendant, Williamsburg Surgery, P.C., and Sentara employs the individual Defendant, Dr. Moniz. York Circuit Court followed Suffolk Circuit Court in finding the blog postings of plaintiff’s counsel outside of its purview.

In an earlier medical malpractice matter, Mahone v. Sentara Hospitals, No. CL-09-560 in Suffolk, Sentara similarly filed an Emergency Petition to terminate the blog postings by Plaintiff’s counsel about his fruits of a hearing against it. That Petition was denied, and Mr. Waterman was free to continue posting on his blog.

On March 16, 2011, additional pre-trial motions were heard in Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in Circuit Court for York County, Virginia, which is scheduled for jury trial in Yorktown beginning March 28, 2011. Marshall is a medical malpractice lawsuit seeking $12,000,000.00 for a victim who after ostensible routine out-patient surgery, suffered 3 surgical injuries at the hands of Defendants; underwent 5 repair surgeries; was hospitalized for over 8 months; almost died several times while an in-patient; incurred about $1,000,000.00 in medical bills; and is permanently, painfully, and debilitatingly disabled with 4-appendage neuropathy.

Among other things, Defendants continued their Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena to Mr. F. Jay Sweeney, IV to a subsequent pre-trial hearing. Plaintiff subpoenaed Mr. Sweeney as a trial witness to prove financial interest and bias of Sentara, since Plaintiff had no choice but to call so many of his Sentara healthcare providers as his witnesses: as Claim Manager for Sentara, Mr. Sweeney knows that Sentara’s $2,000,000.00 in medical malpractice liability insurance is at risk, thereby giving Senatra a significant financial stake in Marshall’s outcome.

Also, the Court denied Mr. Marshall his request that a spoliation instruction be given about destruction of evidence by Defendant, Dr. Moniz; which explicitly would have entitled the jury to infer negatively about the evidence destruction in deciding liability for medical malpractice. Nonetheless, Mr. Marshall still is entitled in Marshall to have his daughter testify that after his third repair surgery on October 24, 2006, Dr. Moniz drew a picture of Mr. Marshall’s internal anatomy to illustrate his understanding and mistake, but then threw away the diagram.

Additionally in Marshall, the Court granted in part Mr. Marshall’s Second Motion in Limine, precluding the non-treating neurologist hired by Defendant’s from speculating about causation of Mr. Marshall’s 4-appendage neuropathy in this medical malpractice case, since that retained expert admitted he did not know the cause. But the Defendants’ paid expert still is allowed to venture that Mr. Marshall’s neuropathy was not caused by his prolonged hospitalization and its incidents (as opined adamantly by his regular treating neurologist of 4 years) and instead supposedly is just a coincidence with the same.

Further, the Court in Marshall denied Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Reliance on Additional Materials. Thereby, Defendant’s inequitably had sought to preclude Mr. Marshall’s long-time treating neurologist from reviewing and testifying in rebuttal about the same additional patient records on which Defendants’ hired neurologist relied so heavily in the medical malpractice suit.

Continue reading " Virginia: Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Evidence " »

Mr. Waterman proudly congratulates his partner, Robert R. “Bobby” Hatten, Esq., on his firm record-setting jury verdict of $25,000,000.00 for an asbestos victim today in Circuit Court for the City of Newport News, Virginia! Increasingly, Peninsula jurors have become savvy to disingenuous attempted defenses to plain liability and permanent damages by deep-pocketed Defendants, their hired-gun experts, and out-of-town lawyers.

For over three decades, Mr. Hatten has dedicated his law practice to representing victims of asbestos with great success. Go Bobby!

On March 15, 2011, Mr. Waterman was recognized for membership in the prestigious Multi-Million Dollar Advocates Forum. This follows a Gloucester jury verdict for $3,250,000.00 for assault and battery, which was coupled with companion jury verdicts of $1,250,000.00 and $500,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest of approximately $1,100,000.00.

Membership is exclusive, strictly limited to those lawyers who have obtained a multi-million dollar verdict or settlement that is final. Initially, Mr. Waterman had been a member of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum for a decade based on a $1,250,000.00 jury verdict he was awarded for a medical malpractice lawsuit in Hampton, Virginia.

In the medical malpractice lawsuit of Marshall v. Moniz, No. CLO8-2018 in Circuit Court for York County and the Town of Poquoson, Virginia, seeking $12,000,000.00 in alleged damages, Defendants have hired a Massachusetts doctor, David W. Rattner, to testify about the “standard of care” here in Virginia. Among other things, Defendants hope to impress the jury by Dr. Rattner being a Harvard doctor with a big resume.

Defendants also hope to keep from the jury in Marshall that Dr. Rattner himself has been sued successfully unto settlement recovery for medical malpractice in Massachusetts. Defendants have moved in limine requesting the Judge to exclude from evidence at trial Dr. Rattner admitting that around 2004-2005 he operated on the wrong site of his patient; that he was sued for his mistake; that approximately $1,000,000.00 was paid to the victim patient; and that the Court record of his case has been sealed from public view.

Conversely, Plaintiff argues that such evidence of mistake by a “standard of care” expert is relevant and even material to the jury in Marshall evaluating the credibility of Dr. Rattner from standpoints of bias, proficiency and/or otherwise. Historically, Dr. Rattner testifies in favor of Defendants at least 85-90% of the time, and is not happy and even has repressed about having been sued by a patient for medical malpractice.

Tellingly, Defendants in Marshall cite no Virginia case excluding the admitted medical malpractice, huge payment, record sealing, and personal humiliation of an expert. Instead, Defendants cite Virginia authority excluding “prior bad acts” of the defendant on “collateral” matters, and just overgeneralize them as supposedly pertaining to any “physician”. E.g., Graham v. Stottlemeyer, 268 Va. 7, 13 (2004).

Significantly, another medical malpractice cited by Defendants, Smith v. Frenkel, No. L03-2784 (Norfolk 2004), underscores the material distinction on this point between a “party” and an “expert”: the Order obtained by Defendants’ counsel in Smith expressly was based on “the representation that the defense does not intend to elicit standard of care testimony from Dr. Frenkel” (emphasis added); whereas conversely in Marshall, the defense intends to elicit “standard of care” plus “causation” testimony from Dr. Rattner. Defendants’ counsel impliedly concedes in Smith that a “standard of care” and “causation” expert committing a mistake, a huge payment being made for it, and being so self-conscious as to a sealed record, is not just a “collateral” matter, but rather is a core one going to credibility, bias, proficiency, etc.

Continue reading " Virginia: Medical Malpractice Expert Bias – a Lawyer’s Impeachment " »

On March 1, 2011, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered Judgment in favor of Mr. Waterman’s client. The special case is United States of America, ex rel., Joseph M. Russell v. Michael J. Gennari, Evonne Fei, and Nancy Lynne Russell, civil action no.4:09cv88 in the Newport News Division, which was set for 2-day trial during May 3-4, 2011.

Relator had filed a qui tam action, alleging fraud and conspiracy to defraud. But for the reasons set forth in its 11-page Memorandum Opinion, the federal court found that Relator failed to allege fraud and conspiracy sufficiently; that it thereby lacked jurisdiction over the special case; and that dismissal in Russell should be with prejudice without leave to amend, since Relator already had amended once with the benefit of counsel.

In Russell, Mr. Waterman made a rare appearance as counsel for a Defendant. His able co-counsel was a medical malpractice defense lawyer no less.