Virginia Injury Attorney Blog

On April 27, 2011, Mr. Waterman was invited to speak for the Seminar Program at the Annual Convention of the Southern Trial Lawyers Association (“STLA”) in New Orleans, Louisiana, during the week of Mardi Gras 2012. His topic will be “Tactics, Techniques or Strategies I Developed in a Recent Case and How Each Affected the Outcome”. For more than a decade, he has belonged to STLA, the membership of which is drawn from Virginia and 12 other states in the Southeast.

Mr. Waterman has been licensed to practice law and in good standing in Louisiana since 1982. He resided in New Orleans during 1982-1986. His practice focused on production liability, medical malpractice, and other personal injury.

On April 25, 2011, Mr. Waterman filed a Petition for Appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court. It arises out of the brain injury case in Circuit Court for Gloucester County, Virginia, Gregory Joseph Gagnon v. Travis Burns, et al., CL08-572.

In Gagnon, the jury awarded the brain injury victim $3,250,000.00 against the assailant, another $500,000.00 against the fellow student who encouraged the assailant, and another $1,250,000.00 against the Assistant Principal who failed to notify school security after bring warned beforehand and assuring he would do so; plus more than $1,000,000.00 in pre-judgment interest. However, the trial court ruled that the jury awards were separate and only could be collected against each Defendant.

The Petition for Appeal in Gagnon seeks the Virginia Supreme Court to find Defendants jointly and severally liable, i.e., to hold that the jury awards can be collected against all Defendants. Assistant Principal Travis Burns enjoys $6,000,000.00 insurance coverage for the brain injury, while the other Defendants have no insurance coverage or known assets.

Mr. Waterman settled a medical malpractice matter for $1,000,000.00. Additional case details are confidential.

The 2009 landmark Virginia Supreme Court decision of Wynn v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 92 (2009), severely limited the testimony of expert witnesses who rely on hearsay, particularly facts and opinions from other non-testifying experts. §8.01-401.1 does not allow “the introduction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence during the direct examination of an expert witness merely because the expert relied on the hearsay information in formulating an opinion.” Id. at 100. “The Commonwealth, however, asserts that our holding in McMunn should be limited to ‘hearsay matters of opinion’ upon which an expert relied. We do not agree whether an expert relies upon the opinion of others or allegations of sexual misconduct in formulating an opinion, both constitute hearsay. [T]he trier of fact cannot observe the demeanor of the speaker and the statements cannot be tested by cross-examination. Id. (emphasis added). The trial court properly excluded hearsay facts, in addition to hearsay opinions, of non-testifying experts. Id. at 101 (citations omitted). See, Exhibit 5(attached). “In Wynn, this Court specifically rejected the argument that the details of adjudicated allegations of sexual misconduct offered by an expert on direct examination, supposedly to show the factual basis of an expert’s opinion, are not hearsay.” Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 490, 497 (2010).

In 2007, the Virginia Supreme Court pronounced that application of its Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) “begins with determining whether the opinion at issue was disclosed in any form.” John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 274 Va. 581, 591 (2007). “Furthermore, a party is not relieved from its disclosure obligation under the Rule simply because the other party has some familiarity with the expert witness or the opportunity to depose the expert. Such a rule would impermissibly alter a party’s burden to disclose and impose an affirmative burden on the non-disclosing party to ascertain the substance of the experts testimony. We reject this reading of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i).” Id. at 592 (emphasis added). “Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) requires that the substance of opinions to be rendered be disclosed. Here, while Crane did disclose the topic of Buccigross’ testimony, Crane did not disclose the substance of Buccigross’ opinions in the disclosure or through Buccigross’ report. Crane thus failed to comply with the Rule.” Id. at 593 (emphasis added). John Crane upheld two defense experts’ opinions being excluded by Newport News Circuit Court, where their substance was not disclosed and their reports were not provided.

Va. Code Ann. §8.01-379.1 guarantees Plaintiff the right to plead and argue his pleaded ad damnum to the jury. The weight of Circuit Court jurisprudence, especially more recent cases, support Plaintiff not having to reduce his ad damnum in a medical malpractice case. See, e.g., Wright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 Va. Cir. 484, 499-504 (Portsmouth Sep. 21, 2004)(attached)(Davis, J.)(citing Morris v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. Cir 216, 223 ( Albemarle Jul. 17, 1998)(Peatross, J.); Benson v. Lowe, 44 Va. Cir. 85, 86-87 (Norfolk Nov. 25, 1997)(Jacobson, J.); Bennett v. Riverside, 43 Va. Cir. 13, 14 (Newport News Mar. 17, 1997)(Frank, J.); Dell v. French, 38 Va. Cir. 91, 100 (Fairfax Aug 2, 1995)(Roush, J.); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. Cir. 311, 318 (Stafford Feb. 9, 2000)(Haley, J.); and see, Amended Judgment, Johnson v. Riverside Hosp., Inc., No. CL00-29638-DP c/w CL01-30571-DP (Newport News Nov. 30, 2005)(attached).

Actually, the medical malpractice opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.15 in 1989 suggests that ad damnum should not be reduced prior to trial. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 96 (1989)(italics in original)(underlining added) (citations omitted). This Etheridge language was reiterated in Supinger v. Stakes, 255 Va. 198, 205 (1998).