March 4, 2010

Virginia Medical Malpractice Discovery - a Lawyer's Deposition

On March 4, 2010, Plaintiff’s three pending Motions were granted at hearing in Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in Circuit Court for York/Poquoson, Virginia. The plaintiff patient alleges medical malpractice and more than $1,000,000.00 in medical bills for which he seeks damages of $12,000,000.00.

First, the judge in Moniz granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Trial Date. Second, he granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Order. Third, he granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant. Dr. Moniz must submit to discovery deposition by April 30, 2010; and the Moniz medical malpractice suit is scheduled for jury trial on the merits during March 28-April, 2011, in Yorktown.

If you or a loved one are victim of medical malpractice, vehicle accident, or other personal injury, please contact Avery T. "Sandy" Waterman, Jr., Esq. in Newport News or Williamsburg, Virginia, at 888.881.7881, 757.881.9881 or contact him online.

February 28, 2010

Virginia Medical Malpractice Orders – a Lawyer’s Hearing

On February 19, 2010, Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Order was filed in the medical malpractice case of Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in Circuit Court for York County, Virginia. The presiding Judge had requested Plaintiff as prevailing party on three issues on February 9, 2010, to draft and circulate the Order memorializing the hearing; but Defendant’s counsel refused to sign as drafted.

Plaintiff’s Motion is scheduled for Court hearing on March 4, 2010. Companion blogs about the three underlying issues and the hearing in the Marshall v. Moniz medical malpractice lawsuit claiming $12,000,000.00 are posted on February 4,6, 8, and 9, 2010.


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February 22, 2010

Virginia Medical Malpractice Orders – a Lawyer’s Motion

On February 22, 2010, plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Order for the hearing on February 5, 2010, in Mahone v. Sentara, a wrongful death action, No. CL09-560 in Circuit Court for the City of Suffolk, Virginia. The presiding Judge requested plaintiff as prevailing party at “emergency” hearing to draft and circulate an Order for endorsement by Defendant Sentara’s attorney of record, Ted G. Yoakam, Esq. of Yoakam & Etheridge, PLC in Virginia Beach, Virginia; but Mr. Yoakam declined to sign as drafted.

To resolve the drafting impasse, Plaintiff’s Motion will be scheduled for Court hearing shortly. Companion blogs on the underlying uses ofSentara Incident # 20119 in the Mahone v. Sentara medical malpractice proceeding claiming $4,250,000.00 are posted on February 2, 5, 15, and 17, 2010.

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February 17, 2010

Virginia Medical Malpractice Incident Report – a Lawyer’s Transcript

On February 17, 2010, the Court Reporter transcribed the hearing in the medical malpractice case of Mahone v. Sentara, No. CL09-560 in Circuit Court for the City of Suffolk Virginia. Plaintiff’s counsel requested the transcript to document the proceedings held on February 2, 2010, which Defendant Sentara’s attorney of record, Ted G. Yoakam, Esq., co-founder/managing partner of Yoakam & Etheridge, PLC in Virginia Beach, disputed.

The Mahone v. Sentara wrongful death suit and Sentara Incident Report # 20119 is the subject of significant companion blog posts on February 2, 5, 15, and 22, 2010. Posting of the full hearing transcript and of other companion blogs is anticipated shortly.

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February 15, 2010

Virginia Medical Malpractice Incident Report – a Lawyer’s Transcript

On February 15, 2010, a court reporter transcribed the “emergency” hearing held on February 5, 2010, in Circuit Court for the City of Suffolk, Virginia in the wrongful death case of Mahone v. Sentara, No. CL09-560. Plaintiff’s counsel requested transcription of the proceedings resolved in his favor because he anticipated that Defendant Sentara’s attorney of record, Ted G. Yoakam, Esq., co-founder/managing partner of Yoakam & Etheridge, PLC in Virginia Beach, Virginia, would continue the dispute over Sentara Incident Report # 20119 and resist entry of his comprehensive Order about it.

The Mahone v. Sentara medical malpractice lawsuit is the subject of significant companion blog posts on February 2, 5, 17, and 22, 2010. Posting of that full hearing transcription, as well as of other companion blogs, is expected soon.

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February 9, 2010

Virginia Medical Malpractice Dilatory Pleadings - a Lawyer’s Hearing

On February 9, 2010, the medical malpractice lawsuit of Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in Circuit Court for the County of York and the Town of Poquoson, Virginia, was heard on the Defendants’ three dilatory pleadings. Plaintiff seeks $12,000,000.00 in compesatory damages, alleging that various surgery-related acts and/or omissions caused him grievous permanent personal injuries, over $1,000,000.00 in medical expenses, and loss of his lucrative career.

First, Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue to the Circuit Court for the City of Williamsburg/James City County, Virginia, was denied. The Court found in the Marshall v. Moniz medical malpractice case that York County was permissible venue based on tortious acts and/or omissions occurring there at the new Sentara Williamsburg Community Hospital and Defendants regularly conducting substantial business activity there at the hospital, pursuant to Va. Code Ann. §8.01-262(3 & 4). The Court in Marshall v. Moniz found that Defendants failed to bear their burden of proving “substantial inconvenience” to witnesses, despite Defendants claiming a 13-mile difference in driving distance. Plaintiff initially having filed suit in Williamsburg was not pertinent to forum non conveniens pursuant to Va. Code Ann. §8.01-265.

Second, Defendants’ Demurrer and Special Pleas of Statute of Limitations, Res Judicata, and Autre Action did not defeat the proceedings and was overruled. The Court in the Marshall v. Moniz medical malpractice case found that the doctrine was not self-executing, only applied if two identical suits were pending at the time of filing and, in and event, did not require that the initial action be the one maintained.

Third, Defendants’ Demurrer for allegations of unspecified negligence was overruled too. The Court in the Marshall v. Moniz medical malpractice suit found that Plaintiff’s negligence itemization of “such other acts and/or omissions as may be discovered, investigated and proved at trial” was gratuitous and, if anything, subject to a Motion to Bill of Particulars and not a Demurrer.

Plaintiff already has requested the discovery deposition of Defendant, Dr. Moniz. Plaintiff is moving to schedule the medical malpractice lawsuit in Marshall v. Moniz for jury trial on the merits in early 2011 at Yorktown Courthouse.

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February 8, 2010

Virginia: Medical Malpractice Va. Code Ann. §8.01-265 – a Lawyer’s Venue

Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in York Circuit Court is a medical malpractice action. Defendants have moved to transfer venue to Williamsburg, Virginia.

Va. Code Ann. §8.01-261 provide “Category A or preferred venue”. There is no preferred venue in the Marshall medical malpractice lawsuit .

Va. Code Ann. §8.01-262(3&4) provide “Category B permissible venue,” wherein “the defendant regularly conducts substantial business activity” and/or “the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose”. York County is permissible venue under both of those subsections in the Marshall medical malpractice suit.

“While plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to absolute deference, it ‘should not be lightly defeated’.” Champigny v. Bagly, 55 Va. Cir 381, 382 (Norfolk Jul. 2, 2001)(citations omitted). “A rebuttable ‘presumption of correctness attaches to a plaintiff’s choice of forum’.” Kollman v. Jordan, 60 Va. Cir. 293, 294 (Chesterfield Oct. 29, 2002). When “considerations are equal or even close, the plaintiff’s choice of forum must prevail.” Wray v. Floyd & Beasley Transfer Co., 29 Va. Cir. 126, 130 (Richmond Sep. 17, 1992).

“Plaintiff does not need to explain his reasons for placing venue in any particular forum that §8.01-262 allows.” Id. “According to the plain language of the statute [§8.01-265], Defendant has the burden to show good cause for a transfer.” Id.

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February 6, 2010

Virginia: Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Pleading

Marshall v. Moniz is a medical malpractice lawsuit pending in Circuit Court for York County, Virginia. Defendants have filed a Demurrer to strike Plaintiff’s “catch-all” allegation of negligence: “Such other tortious acts and omissions as may be investigated, discovered and proved”.

Yet, it is hornbook law that Virginia is a “notice” pleading state. “Every pleading shall state facts on which the party relied in numbered paragraphs, and it shall be sufficient if it clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense.” Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 1:4(d)(emphasis added).

Conversely, Virginia pleading does not require plaintiffs to itemize details of negligence. “An allegation of negligence. . . is sufficient without specifying the particulars of the negligence.” Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 3:18(b)(emphasis added).

A Demurrer is used to make “the contention that a pleading does not state a cause of action or that such pleading fails to state facts upon which the relief demanded can be granted.” Va. Code Ann. §8.01-273(A). “[I]t is unnecessary for the pleader to descend into statements giving the details of the proof in order to withstand demurrer” if the complaint informs the defendant of the nature and character of the claim. Catercorp, Inc. v. Cathering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 24 (1993).

Thus, in Ragsdale v. Jones, 202 Va. 278, 284 (1960), the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the admission of intoxication evidence, even through negligence in general and not intoxication in particular was pleaded. Likewise, in Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., Inc., 208 Va. 438, 439 (1967)(reversing a supposed failure to state), the Virginia Supreme Court found sufficient plaintiff’s pleading of negligence that defendant “proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, both mental and physical”. Likewise, Moore v. Payless Supermarket, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 197, 200 ( Wise Sep. 15, 1989) found the “general allegation of negligence is sufficient”. Similarly, Cunningham v. Roanoke Reg. Airport Comm’n, 70 Va. Cir. 273, 276 ( Roanoke Mar. 8, 2006) held “pleadings are not required to assert anything more than a general allegation of negligence”.

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February 5, 2010

Virginia Medical Malpractice Incident Report – a Lawyer’s Petition

On February 4, 2010, Defendant Sentara Hospitals filed Emergency Petition for Immediate Relief in the medical malpractice case of Mahone v. Sentara, No. CL09-560 in Circuit Court for the City of Suffolk, Virginia. Sentara was represented by its attorney of record, Ted G. Yoakam, Esq. of Yoakam & Etheridge, PLC in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and its Risk Manager, Ms. Amanda Goodwin, as its corporate designee.

Sentara’s Emergency Petition accused that the related blog post of February 2, 2010, was “inappropriate conduct”. It prayed in the Mahone v. Sentara wrongful death suit: (a) That plaintiff’s counsel, Avery T. Waterman, Jr., be ordered to immediately remove the blog posted by plaintiff’s counsel on February 2, 2010, in its entirety; (b) That plaintiff prove to this Court, and Sentara, that the blog has been removed and that a diligent search to remove all “cached” versions of the entry that could be found on the internet were removed; (c) That the Court issue an Order on plaintiff’s counsel to take no further actions in regard to this case until such time as a full formal hearing can be had before the Court to determine if plaintiff’s counsel can continue representing the Estate of Felicia T. Madison in this matter; and (d) That Plaintiff’s counsel be ordered to secure Incident Report # 20119, and all copies thereof, and return them to the Court pending a ruling from the Court as to these earlier requested matters given his public disgorgement of confidential information.

Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition in the Mahone v. Sentara medical malpractice proceedings. Mr. Waterman advances multiple grounds justifying the blog posting, including particularly without limitation that: (1) the underlying Sentara Incident Report # 20119 was not privileged in fact; (2) the “substantial need” exception applied to any claimed privilege; (3) any claimed privilege without exception was waived by Mr. Yoakam’s voluntary production; (4) his production was in open Court without any protective order; (5) Plaintiff would not have agreed to any restriction on production; and (6) ex post facto censure violates and chills Constitutional rights of free speech and Court access.

At "emergency" hearing on February 5, 2010, the presiding Judge in the Mahone v. Sentara wrongful death action was “disturbed” by Sentara’s Emergency Petition; found that Williamsburg/Newport News attorney Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. “acted fully professionally in turning the document [Sentara Incident Report # 20119] over” and was “free to publish whatever he wants”; and denied Sentara’s Emergency Petition and all relief. The Judge also denied the repeated oral Motion of Ted G. Yoakam, Esq. to prohibit further disclosure on this topic.

Ironically, Ted G. Yoakam, Esq., as plaintiff’s counsel has made numerous public disclosures for almost a year about his pending multi-party “coal ash dump” lawsuits filed in Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake, Virginia, No. CL09000710-00 Fentress Family Trust v. Virginia Electric and Power Company and No. CL09001914-00 Darryl Sears v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. Indeed, Mr. Yoakam’s own pending “coal ash dump” litigation disclosures were made in City Council meetings, The Virginian-Pilot articles, and even “60 Minutes” television broadcasts.

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February 4, 2010

Virginia: Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Non-Suit

The medical malpractice lawsuit of Marshall v. Moniz, No. CL08-2018 in York Circuit Court, initially was filed in Williamsburg/James City County and non-suited after the refilling in York County, Virginia. Defendants have filed a Special Plea and Demurrer for dismissal with prejudice based on that litigation history.

The Supreme Court of Virginia already has countenanced the exact procedure postural of the Marshall medical malpractice suit. Plaintiffs are entitled to file one action, file a second action in another jurisdiction, non-suit the first action, and proceed with the second action in the different jurisdiction. Moore v. Gills¸ 239 Va. 239 (1990). Cf., Smith v. Ellis, 28 Va. Cir. 180 (Richmond May 21, 1992).

“An ‘action’ and a ‘cause of action’ are quite different. ‘Action’ is defined [as ‘all civil proceedings whether at law, in equity, or statutory in nature’]. We defined ‘cause of action’ . . . as ‘a set of operative facts which under substantive law, may give rise to a right of action’.” Trout v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r of Virginia, 241 Va. 69, 73 (1991).

“Nonsuit remains. . . distinctly a weapon in the arsenal of a plaintiff.” Id. “The effect of a nonsuit is simply to put an end to the present action, but is no bar to a subsequent action for the same cause.” Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire and Life Ins. Co., 166 Va. 95, 97 (1936). Cf., Virginia Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Sup’rs, 197 Va. 821, 826 (1956). “[T]he only effect of a non-suit is to put an end to the pending litigation without prejudice to either party.” Tysons Toyota, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 36692, * 19 (4th Cir. 1994); Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 37 F.3d 1053, 1058 (4th Cir. 1994); Umphreyville v. Gittins, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 454, * 5 (W.D. Va. Jan 6, 2009); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville; 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20027, *5 (W.D. Va. 2006); Poullah v. Rzasa, 75 Va. Cir. 349, 352 (Fairfax Jul. 15, 2008); Cook v. Wayland, 64 Va. Cir. 386, 387 (Waynesboro Apr. 26, 2004); Odeneal v. Thompson, 63 Va. Cir. 71, 73 ( Fairfax Aug. 6, 2003); Green v. Barnes, 54 Va. Cir. 348, 350 (Portsmouth Jan 4. 2001).

Thus in the medical malpractice case of Marshall, Plaintiff’s non-suit of his first action was not a dismissal with prejudice of his underlying cause of action. It simply put an end to that first action without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing his subsequent action on the same cause of action.

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February 2, 2010

Virginia: Medical Malpractice Incident Report – a Lawyer’s Production

Avoiding adverse ruling at hearing on February 2, 2010, Sentara Obici Hospitals capitulated after oral argument and produced so-called “incident report” to Plaintiff that it had claimed was privileged in a medical malpractice action. The case is Mahone v. Sentara Hospitals, No. CL09-560 in Circuit Court for the City of Suffolk, Virginia, which alleges wrongful death of a patient who bled to death during her overnight stay at Sentara Louise Obici Memorial Hospital.

Sentara’s attorney of record, Ted G. Yoakam, Esq. of Yoakam & Etheridge, PLC in Virginia Beach, Virginia, at hearing characterized Incident Report # 20119 as a blood bank protocol document that was irrelevant to the medical malpractice. But on its face, Sentara’s Incident Report #20119 actually records material factual patient care information that the Virginia Supreme Court opined was discoverable and admissible in its landmark decision, Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006), litigated by Plaintiff’s counsel, Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. of Williamsburg and Newport News, Virginia.

Sentara Incident Report # 20119 proves that the exsanguinating patient in Mahone v. Sentara never was transfused the unit of blood she was ordered hours earlier by her doctor due to Sentara nursing staff’s failure to restart an IV site, contributing to patient demise. Among other things, Sentara Incident Report # 20119 also documents the dying patient’s diagnosis (hemolytic anemia, thrombocytopenia) in this ostensibly mysterious case of wrongful death, plus identifies three Sentara employees with pertinent knowledge.

Like most if not all secreted incident reports, Sentara Incident Report # 20119 contains relevant factual patient care information missing from and at variance with Nursing Notes of the limited so-called “patient chart” to which hospitals seek to limit patient access for review. Patient charts are sanitized healthcare industry-wide by the systematic institutional laundering of key harmful patient care facts into incident reports that are segregated from the patient chart (often in computer databases).

Sentara Incident Report #20119 is particularly significant in the medical malpractice lawsuit of Mahone v. Sentara because suspiciously there are no contemporaneous Nursing Notes from 11:05 p.m. through and beyond the patient’s death at 5:38 a.m.. Instead, post-death, from 5:40 a.m. to 9:32 a.m., a Sentara L.P.N. created fifteen (15) Notes and one (1) Addendum of purportedly what happened from 12:15 a.m. to 4:10 a.m.

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October 14, 2009

Virginia: Ca. Code Ann. §8.01-355(B) – a Lawyer’s Reconsideration

On October 14, 2009, Newport News Circuit Court denied defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration in this medical malpractice case. In Andleton v. Connolly, No. 31197, the Judge construed Va. Code Ann. §8.01-335(B) on a matter of first impression.

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September 16, 2009

Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-335(B) – a Lawyer’s Construction

On September 16, 2009, Newport News Circuit Court denied a Motion to Dismiss in a medical malpractice case of first impression, Andleton v. Connolly, No. 31197. It construed Va. Code Ann. §8.01-335(B).

Section 8.01-335(B) permits reinstatement of a plaintiff’s case within one year of its dismissal under that statute for three-plus years of inactivity. In Andleton, the Court made new law in holding that the claimant was entitled to reinstate within one year of dismissal under §8.01-335(B) even though the statute of limitation for filing the underlying medical malpractice claim had run at the time.

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July 14, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Amendments

In medical malpractice suits alleging wrongful death and brain injury, Circuit Court for the City of Newport News, Virginia, has granted plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaints, including after the statute of limitation has run. The cases are Licare v. Riverside Health System, No. 0702452T-01, and Morel v. Mary Immaculate Nursing Center, Inc., No. CL0703905P-03.

Both medical malpractice decisions were predicted on three independent grounds: (1) Plaintiff not being provided all factual patient care records and papers voluntarily; (2) Plaintiff being delayed by defense pleading; and (3) Plaintiff having originally alleged generally “such other tortious acts and/or omissions as may be investigated, discovered and proved”. Orders were entered in the wrongful death case of Licare on February 1, 2008, and in the brain injury case of Morel on September 2, 2008.

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April 10, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice: VSC Reliable Authority – a Lawyer’s Usage

On April 18, 2008, the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of “reliable authority” under Va. Code Ann. §8.01-401.1. The medical malpractice case is Bostic v. About Women OB/GYN, P.C., 275 Va. 567 (2008).

In Bostic, defense counsel read article quotes and questioned his client about the same while on the stand as a fact witness. Defense counsel overcame plaintiff’s objection by representing that the defense expert subsequently would lay the necessary evidentiary foundation for the article. Id. at 572-573.

The Virginia Supreme Court in Bostic recounted that the 1994 Ammendment to §8.01-401.1 inserted “two preconditions to the admission of hearsay expert opinions as substantive evidence on direct examination: First, the testifying witness must have ‘relied upon’ the statements contained in the published treatises; Second, the statements must be established as ‘a reliable authority’ by testimony or by stipulation.” Id. at 576. “The statutory term means that the witness must testify that he relied on the article in forming his opinion….” Id. at 577.

Thus, in Bostic the defendant’s foundation was insufficient where her medical malpractice expert accepted the article “only partially” and was “candidly uncertain”. Id. Moreover, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff’s request for a cautionary instruction after that expert’s insufficient testimony was not too late, where plaintiff had objected to the article when first introduced. Id. at 577-578 (reversing and remanding defense verdict).

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April 9, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice: VSC Superseding Intervening Cause – a Lawyer’s Instruction

On June 6, 2008, the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the superseding intervening cause instruction. The medical malpractice case of wrongful death is Williams v. Le, 276 Va. 161 (2008).

In Williams, the defendant radiologist failed to communicate directly to the treating physician a positive Dopplar ultrasound, and the patient later died from pulmonary embolism. Asserting arguendo that the alleged proximate causation of any failure to communicate directly was broken completely by the treating physician’s subsequent failure to read the diagnostic report, the defendant radiologist obtained a jury instruction on superseding intervening cause.

The Virginia Supreme Court in Williams delineated for medical malpractice cases: “In order to relieve a defendant of liability for his negligent act, the negligence intervening between the defendant’s negligent act and the injury must so entirely supersede the operation of the defendant’s negligence that it alone, without any contributing negligence of the defendant in the slightest degree, causes the injury.” Id. at 167. But an “intervening cause does not operate to exempt a defendant from liability if that cause is put into operation by the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.” Id.

“On this record,” observed the Virginia Supreme Court in Williams, “it cannot be said that Dr. Le’s alleged negligence was not contributing ‘in the slightest degree’ to the death of Williams. The trial court therefore erred in granting the superseding intervening causation instruction.” Id. at167-168 (reversing and remanding defense verdict).

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April 8, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice: VSC Res Ipsa Loquitur – a Lawyer’s Sufficiency

On June 6, 2008, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a medical malpractice verdict for roughly $100,000.00 unsupported by a medical expert. The case is Webb v. Smith, 276 Va. 305 (2008).

The Virginia Supreme Court in Webb reiterated that “in medical malpractice cases, ‘expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to establish the appropriate standard of care, to establish a deviation from the standard, and to establish that such a deviation from the proximate cause of the claimed damages’.” Id. at 308. “Exceptions to this rule exist only in ‘those rare cases in which a healthcare provider’s act or omission is clearly negligent within the common knowledge of laymen’.” Id.

Such a “rare case” involves the medical malpractice doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. That translates to “the thing speaks for itself”.

In Webb, a surgeon was supposed to perform a hysterectomy and a bilateral salpingo oophorectomy, but simply forgot to perform the latter. In upholding the medical malpractice award, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded in Webb: “A reasonably intelligent juror did not need an expert to explain why Dr. Smith’s negligence was the proximate cause of Webb’s damages because the issue of causation was within the common knowledge of laymen.” Id.

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April 7, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice: VSC Wrongful Birth – a Lawyer’s Insufficiency

On October 31, 2008, the Virginia Supreme Court decided issues of physician-patient relationship and damages proximate causation. The “wrongful birth” medical malpractice case is Fruiterman v. Granata, 276 Va. 629 (2008).

In Fruiterman, the plaintiff mother claimed medical malpractice for her Ob/Gyn failing to inform her about first trimester testing for genetic defects for which she would have elected to terminate her pregnancy. The plaintiff father in Fruiterman made a parallel claim. Id. at 633.

The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the mother’s medical malpractice claim for her failing to prove proximate causation by expert testimony. Specifically, she “did not prove to a reasonably degree of medical probability that, if she had undergone CVS, the result would have shown the chromosomal abnormality indicative of Down syndrome.” Id. at 638.

Additionally, the Virginia Supreme Court that the father failed to prove the requisite physician-patient relationship requisite for a medical malpractice claim, since he never entrusted, and the Ob/Gyn never accepted, his treatment. Id. at 644. Significantly, however, Fruiterman may leave open the possibility of a medical malpractice claim by a father if and to the extent that a Ob/Gyn advised “as a couple about genetic counseling or … recommend[ed] genetic screening tests that either [the father] alone or both of them would need to undergo. Id.

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April 6, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice: VSC Out-of-State Experts – a Lawyer’s Qualification

On January 16, 2009, the Virginia Supreme Court handed down an opinion on qualification of out-of-state experts pursuant to Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.20. The medical malpractice case of wrongful death is Jackson v. Qureshi, 277 Va. 114 (2009).

Jackson addressed the statutory presumption, “knowledge” requirement, and “active clinical practice” requirement for medical malpractice standard of care experts. First, the out-of-state expert was presumed to know Virginia’s statewide standard of care by having met the “educational and examination requirements of the statute,” per the “letter from the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health Professions”. Id. at 122. Second, the statutory “knowledge” requirement was shown by the out-of-state expert’s “area of qualification and certification” having “certain overlapping and medical practices and similar standards of care” with the defendant’s “area of qualification and certification”; which essentially was established by the out-of-state expert’s own testimony. Id. at 122-123. Third, the out-of-state expert satisfied the statute’s “active clinical practice” requirement where in his “clinical practice the expert performs the procedure at issue and the standard of care for performing the procedure is the same,” with no “minimum threshold amount of time” beyond deminimis being required. Id. at 124-125.

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April 5, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice: VSC Wrongful Death & Survival Actions – a Lawyer’s Concurrence

On January 16, 2009, the Virginia Supreme Court resolved a wrongful death action and a survival action for personal injuries. The medical malpractice case is Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 Va. 59 (2009).

Centra Health upheld an estate representative maintaining concurrent damage causes of action for wrongful death and for survival for personal injuries through jury verdict. “In this particular [medical malpractice] case, the circuit court correctly determined that compelling an election [prior to or even at trial] would put the administrators in the untenable, and manifestly unjust, position of having to elect between two potentially viable claims, which Centra Health was contesting on separate and independent grounds.” Id. at 79.

Additionally, Centra Health upheld the survival action award of $325,000.00 for personal injury damages as not reflecting any confusion, undue sympathy, or other excessiveness. The Virginia Supreme Court found that the trial court was painstaking in its instructions and that the defendant’s characterization of the personal injuries arising from medical malpractice minimized them unduly. Id. at 81-82.

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March 29, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice Cap: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.15 – a Lawyer’s Claim

Senate Bill 843 failed to pass the 2009 Virginia General Assembly. It was defeated by the wealthy powerful healthcare industry, including the Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association (“VHHA”), which represents the one hundred leading hospitals and other healthcare institutions in Virginia.

Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.15, the so-called “medical malpractice cap,” limits the amount that any victim patient actually can recover from an offending healthcare provider, regardless how much appropriately is awarded by a jury or judge at trial. Virginia’s cap has been fixed at $2,000,000.00 since July 1, 2008.

Virginia’s medical malpractice cap is protectionist special interest legislation of healthcare providers, which no other citizen of Virginia enjoys. It inequitably limits the fair compensation awarded by juries and judges to victim patients who have been injured most profoundly by nursing home abuse and other medical malpractice.

The VHHA and other healthcare providers successfully lobbied against increasing the current inequitable limit of victim compensation for nursing home abuse and other medical malpractice. In fact, if the VHHA and others in the health industry had their way, the amount recoverable by victim patients would be decreased regardless how disabling and otherwise severe the injuries inflicted upon them.

Indeed, as a foil to Senate Bill 843, health industry proponents sought passage of their own special interest legislation, House Joint Resolution 658. That would have commissioned a sub-committee to study the supposed “current and impending severe shortage” of medical doctors ostensibly due to “the effect of excessive malpractice insurance premiums, malpractice laws and caps…”.

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March 28, 2009

Medical Malpractice: University of Virginia School of Law – a Lawyer’s Judging

Today the University of Virginia (“UVA”) School of Law in Charlottesville, Virginia, conducts First-Year Oral Arguments in its traditional Moot Court Competition. Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. has been invited and is participating as a Judge.

Competition ever is stiff and winning always an honor. Senator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy is one of the noted UVA Competition victors.

This year’s Competition features three issues. Mr. Waterman will judge the Medical Arbitration issue (medical arbitration agreements, powers of attorney and spousal agency), since he routinely handles medical malpractice cases.

Mr. Waterman participated in the Moot Court Competition at UVA while a student. He also represented the Law School in regional competition with other law schools.

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March 27, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice Admissions: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-52.1 & 8.01-581.20:1 – a Lawyer’s Inadmissibility

House Bill 2057 passed the Virginia General Assembly in 2009. Effective July 1, 2009, it amends Va. Code Ann. §8.01-52.1 and §8.01-581.20:1.

Prior to amendment, the statute rendered certain so-called “gestures expressing sympathy or general sense of benevolence” inadmissible against a healthcare provider in cases of nursing home abuse and other medical malpractice. The amendment expands that to include “commiseration, condolence, compassion . . . together with apologies.”

At common law and in court rules, such admissions of liability or other statements against interest by a wrongdoer could be introduced in cases of nursing home abuse and other medical malpractice. Hence, the statute and its amendment is protectionist legislation enjoyed by healthcare providers and no other citizens of Virginia.

Studies have shown that healthcare providers guilty of nursing home abuse and other medical malpractice who admit liability to their patients after-the-fact are less likely to be sued for their wrongdoing and resulting damages. Thus, this special interest legislation essentially lets all offending healthcare providers admit liability with impunity toward avoiding being sued, but then to duplicitously deny liability to unknown jurors and to gag the knowing victims at trial if still sued.

If you or a loved one is victim of nursing home abuse or other medical malpractice, please contact Avery T. "Sandy" Waterman, Jr., Esq. in Newport News or Williamsburg, Virginia, at 888.881.7881, 757.881.9881 or contact him online.

March 26, 2009

Virginia Personal Injury Communications: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-399(Amended) – a Lawyer’s Privilege

Senate Bill 1275 passed the 2009 Virginia General Assembly. Effective July 1, 2009, it amends Va. Code Ann. §8.01-399.

That statute codifies the so-called “physician-patient” privilege. That privilege renders confidential from disclosure communications between patients and physicians in the course of treatment for brain injuries and other personal injuries.

Before the amendment, overly aggressive physicians asserted that the privilege was theirs to waive, and disclosed confidential information of their patients to help defense-oriented interests, such as other healthcare providers committing medical malpractice, vehicle accident offenders, defective product manufacturers, defective premises owners, sexual abuse perpetrators and other criminals. But the statutory amendment is clear that the patient alone will control whether any privilege is waived and confidential communication is disclosed.

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March 25, 2009

Virginia Personal Injury Bills: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413 (Amended) – a Lawyer’s Charges

Senate Bill 1154 passed Virginia General Assembly in 2009. Effective July 1, 2009, It amends Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413.

Prior to the amendment, healthcare providers routintely were charging a flat fee of $10.00 plus $0.50-$1.00 per page for providing their patients their account statements. That obviously cost victims of vehicle accidents, nursing home abuse, other medical malpractice, product or premises defect, sexual abuse or other crimes who simply were trying to get their bills paid.

After the amendment, healthcare providers must provide all patients an itemized listing of charges and account balance at no cost. Indeed, a victim patient will be entitled to request free printouts up to three times every twelve months.

For many patients the cost savings will be multiplied across numerous healthcare providers. Most victims of vehicle accidents, nursing home abuse, other medical malpractice, product or premises defect, sexual abuse or other crimes have to consult the variety of healthcare providers.

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March 21, 2009

Virginia Life Expectancy: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-419 (Amended) – a Lawyer’s Table

House Bill 2035 passed the 2009 Virginia General Assembly. Effective July 1, 2009, it amends Va. Code Ann. §8.01-419.

That statute routinely is introduced unto evidence in cases of vehicle accidents, nursing home abuse, other medical malpractice, product liability, premises liability and other cases involving wrongful death, brain injury and other personal injuries. Its actuarial table of life expectancy helps a jury or judge quantify the duration of a victim’s damages.

Virginia citizens generally living longer translates into higher life expectancy figures. That means victims of wrongful death, brain injury and other personal injury generally will suffer longer and deserve greater damage awards.

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March 20, 2009

Virginia MVA Reports: Va. Code Ann. §46.2-373 (Amended) – a Lawyer’s Witness

Senate Bill 39 passed the Virginia General Assembly in 2009. Effective July 1, 2009, it amends Va. Code Ann. §46.2-373.

The new amendment increases the threshold at which motor vehicle accidents are subject to written reports by the police. The vehicle damage threshold moves from $1,000.00 to $1,500.00 to be reportable.

From a personal injury standpoint, the amended statute stands to create more “he said, she said” disputes after-the-fact, because no independent officer will be taking statements or otherwise recording facts independently. Hence, the onus will be on victim’s of such vehicle accidents to identify witnesses themselves, which may prove a daunting if not impossible task given the accident circumstances and their personal injuries.

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March 14, 2009

Virginia Discovery: Va. Sup. Ct. Rules 4:8 and 4:9 – a Lawyer’s Timing

Virginia Supreme Court Rules 4:8 and 4:9 specify time deadlines – usually 21 but sometimes 28 days – for a party to object or to answer and produce. Thus, a failure to object on time maybe deemed a waiver of the objection, particularly in medical malpractice cases where counsel tend be more picayune.

Plaintiffs and Defendants alike have suffered waivers where they failed to object to Interrogatories and/or Responses for Production on time. See, e.g., Waterman v. Halverson, No. 26466-RW, Order at 2 (Newport News Sep. 21, 1999); Keeble v. Webb, No. L98-714, Order (Norfolk May 14, 1999); and Passmore v. Sentara Hosp.- Norfolk, No. L96-1641, Order (Norfolk Jun. 17, 1997). Passmore, a medical malpractice action, declares “by not filing objections to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents within twenty-one (21) days after that discovery pleading was served, this Court is of the opinion that Sentara Hospitals – Norfolk has waived any objections….” See also, Garner v. Sentara Gen. Hosp., No. CL00-1107, Order at 2 (Norfolk Feb. 12, 2001); and Jennings v. O’Shanick, No. LT2097-3, Order at 1 (Richmond Nov. 12, 1991).

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March 12, 2009

Personal Injury: Virginia Trial Lawyer’s Association – a Lawyer’s Convention

Today begins the annual convention of the Virginia Trial Lawyer’s Association (“VTLA”) in Williamsburg, Virginia. Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. is one of its Williamsburg Society members and will be attending.

VTLA is an association of trial lawyers from throughout Virginia, many of whom practice vehicle accident, medical malpractice, premises liability, and other personal injury litigation. The Association meets once a year, rotating sites with The Homestead in Hot Springs, Virginia, and The Greenbrier in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.

The annual convention spans a four-day weekend early each Spring. Members enjoy the wonderful surroundings amid days of continuing legal education (“CLE”).

CLE offerings cover personal injuries such as wrongful death, brain injuries, limb paralysis, and skin burns. Mr. Waterman soon will post new learning from it.

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February 22, 2009

Newport News Medical Malpractice: Riverside Discovery Order – a Lawyer’s Experience

Newport News Circuit Court ruled on discovery matters in a patient fall suit, Shakshober v. Riverside Hospital, Inc., alleging medical malpractice and resulting brain injury. That was at contradictory hearing on February 9, 2009.

The primary sweep of the impending Discovery Order was disgorging from Riverside materials and of its Nursing Schools. Included were materials, other information and witnesses on Nursing School policies, procedures, protocols, presentations, and all teaching or instruction about patient falls.

Having its Nursing Schools’ material, information and testimony helps greatly in exposing the truth about what goes on vis-à-vis nursing error and holds Riverside to it. Evidence which otherwise arguably may not be introduced in a medical malpractice case when offered as that of the Riverside entity employing a substandard nurse, still may be admissible as that of Riverside’s Nursing Schools. Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518, 528-530 (2006).

Secondarily, but importantly, the Discovery Order compels Riverside to tender appropriate corporate representatives for deposition. Riverside unfairly continues not to tender its most knowledgeable personnel for its deposition, which dodges patient fall and other medical malpractice victims pinning down the corporation in testimony.

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February 11, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413 – a Lawyer’s Application

Healthcare providers uniformly have resisted production of factual patient care records they claim ostensibly are “quality care” and/or “peer review” papers. But they uniformly have lost under Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413 in pending but unserved medical malpractice cases.

Mary Immaculate (thrice), Riverside (twice), Sentara (once), and Carilion (once) has lost contesting the applicability of § 8.01-413(B) to “quality care” and/or “peer review” materials and the propriety of §8.01-413(C) subpoena enforcement during medical malpractice suit. At hearing on March 15, 2007, Williamsburg/James City Circuit Court “FINDS that § 8.01-413(C) is clear and prevails over Va. S. Ct. Rule 4:9(b) and that plaintiff’s Subpoena Duces Tecum is not procedurally flawed. The Court FINDS further that the case law is clear about incident reports and that the Quality Care Control Report in question does not appear to be privileged under Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.76 or §8.01-581.17 or under Virginia’s ‘work product’ doctrine.” See, 4/30/07 Justis v. Sentara Order (emphasis added). Judge Ford rejected Sentara’s objections despite its Medical Affairs Vice-President and Quality Board Chairman testifying. Id.; 3/5/07 Justis v. Sentara Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 15. No incident report database, sentinel event report or investigative materials were at the issue in Justis.

Likewise, at hearing on July 10, 2007, Newport News Circuit Court “FINDS that § 8.01-413 is clear and prevails over Va. S. Ct. Rule 4:9(b); that the patient’s Subpoena Duces Tecum is not procedurally flawed; and that the patient’s Subpoena is proper. The Court FINDS FURTHER that ‘facts [and] information related to patient care’ are not privileged under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 or work product doctrine.” See, 8/3/07 Licare v. Riverside Order (underlining added). Judge Tench ordered Riverside produce in cameraall ‘hospital records and papers’ … of or relating to the patient , Rosemary A. Licare, including particularly without limitation any Quality Management System database entries and any Sentinel Event Report, Root Cause Analysis , investigations email and/or other printed electronic materials whatsoever.” Id. (underlining added). Judge Tench then redacted and disseminated Riverside records. See, 10/31/07 Licare v. Riverside Judge’s Letter.

Similarly, at hearing on January 30, 2008, Newport News Circuit Court “FINDS that patient’s Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413(C) Subpoena Duces Tecum is proper on the ground a statute is superior to a rule, and …ORDERS… that Mary Immaculate Nursing Center, Inc. shall provide the patient all fact-based materials responsive to the Subpoena, even if claimed to be ‘quality’ ones”. See, 2/26/08 Morel v. Mary Immaculate Order at 1 (underlining added). Incredibly, Mary Immaculate had withheld 9 categories of documents – quality care reports, investigative files, incident logs, weekly fall committee meeting minutes, narrative reports, 24 hour nursing reports, fall data collection forms, daily communication tools, and skin tear investigative forms – with 6 of the 9 categories withheld proving to be 590 pages of purely fact-based patient records. Judge Pugh expedited to the bottom-line: “And if it’s fact based, I don’t care if it’s in a quality control document or not, if it’s fact based, he’s entitled to it.” See, 1/30/08 Morel v. Mary Immaculate Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 20.21-33 (emphasis added).

Another evidentiary hearing in Morel was held on April 7, 2008, because Mary Immaculate claimed another 56 pages of records about the patient’s care were protected. After in camera review and evidentiary hearing, Judge Pugh opined that most of those 56 pages were not privileged either for not being “associated with a protected committee,” not being “part of the deliberative process” and/or not being “made in anticipation of litigation”. See, 5/5/08 Morel v. Mary Immaculate Order at 2-4. Subsequently, Mary Immaculate supplemented with more ostensibly privileged records, astoundingly aggregating to over 700 pages with a medical malpractice case pending!

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February 10, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413 – a Lawyer’s Admissions

Some healthcare providers strenuously deny the applicability of Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413(B & C) while suit for medical malpractice is pending. But tellingly, others have admitted its applicability, even with suit unserved.

After Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006), Riverside thrice admitted the applicability of §8.01-413(B) to ostensible “quality care” records – all while medical malpractice suit was “pending”. First, for pre-suit and post-suit §8.01-413(B) requests in Shakshober v. Riverside, Riverside voluntarily produced multiple ostensible “quality care” papers. See, 11/16&21/06 & 3/17/08 Shakshober v. Riverside Letters of Waterman and Defense Counsel; 2/16/06 Shakshober v. Riverside Fall Quality Care Control Report (“QCCR”); 2/26/08 Shakshober v. Riverside Midas Risk Management Worksheets; 2/17/06 Shakshober v. Riverside Procedure/Practices Quality Care Control Report; 2/16/06 Shakshober v. Riverside Falls Abstraction Data Tool; and 2/26/08 Shakshober v. Riverside QMS Transaction Summary Report Excerpt.

Second, with another medical malpractice case, Seibert v. Riverside, pending in response to pre-service §8.01-413(B) request for incident reports, Riverside voluntarily provided the QCCR. See, Seibert v. Riverside 11/29/06 & 1/2/07 Letters of Waterman and Defense Counsel; and 7/14/05 Seibert v. Riverside RHS Quality Care Control Report. Riverside admitted its QCCR actually was created by its medical malpractice insurer; “contains factual information that is provided…in the ordinary course of its business”; and is “a factual record that pursuant to [8.01-581.17] now is discoverable.” See, 3/13/07 Seibert v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 13.13-24 & 21.3-8

Third, with yet another medical malpractice case, Licare v. Riverside, pending in response to Licare’s pre-service § 8.01-413(B) request for the deceased’s incident reports and database, Riverside belatedly provided voluntarily part of the Quality Management System (“QMS”) incident report database. See, 2/16/07, 2/27/07 & 7/2/07 Licare v. Riverside Letters of Defense Counsel to Waterman; and 2/5/07 Licare v. Riverside QMS Database Transaction Summary Report. At hearing, Riverside admitted: “it’s my understanding that that Indicator Text [of the database] is essentially a transposition of what was in the incident report [‘not currently in existence’].” See, 7/10/07 Licare v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 27.3-19.

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February 9, 2009

Medical Malpractice, Wrongful Death, Vehicle Accidents, & Other Personal Injury: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413 - a Lawyer's Records

Despite refusing to comply with Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413(B) in medical malpractice, wrongful death, vehicle accident, and other personal injury cases, some healthcare providers try to avoid enforcement by companion §8.01-413(C). Their threshold argument that statutory enforcement under §8.01-413(C) constitutes impermissible litigation discovery is unfounded.

Va. S. Ct. Rule 4:9 (c) is inapplicable to a statutory enforcement proceeding under §8.01-413(C). Most Subpoenas are issued pursuant to Rule 4:9(c) as litigation discovery. But a §8.01-413(C) Subpoena is different. Contrary to Rule 4:9(c) subpoenas, it enforces patient’s pre-service statutory right to healthcare provider “records or papers” without resort to ordinary litigation discovery after service. Significantly, §8.01-413(C) specifically directs issuance of this Subpoena pursuant to it as the sole remedy for non-compliance with §8.01-413(B).

It is hornbook law that a specific statute of the General Assembly takes precedence over general Rules of the Court. See, e.g., Virginia Constitution, Art. ¬6, Sec. 5. Indeed, Riverside and Mary Immaculate have so conceded on point in medical malpractice cases. See, 7/10/07 Licare v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 29.3-14; 1/30/08 Morel v. Mary Immaculate Hearing Transcript at 18.18-21. Further, it also is hornbook law that §8.01-413(C) and Rule 4:9(c) should be harmonized; and the only way to harmonize them is to recognize §8.01-413(C) as an entirely different and independent source of authority for issuance of a Subpoena from Rule 4:9(c) or, at the least, that §8.01-413(C) is a limited statutory exception to the general, Rule 4:9(c).

Holding Rule 4:9(c) superior and preemptive would eviscerate the clear letter and intent of §8.01-413(B&C), thereby encouraging, facilitating and countenancing potential and/or actual defendants to withhold all or at least key records or papers of victim patient plaintiffs in violation of statute. Also, in medical malpractice cases, it inequitably would force a patient plaintiff to meet his statutory pre-service expert certification requirements under §8.01-20.1 and/or §8.01-50.1 without the benefit of the facility records and papers to which he is entitled by statute, frustrating the same. Additionally, it violates the procedural and substantive due process rights of victim patients against offending defendants.

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February 8, 2009

Medical Malpractice, Wrongful Death, Vehicle Accidents, & Other Personal Injury: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413 - a Lawyer's Enforcement

Medical malpractice, vehicle accident, wrongful death, product liability, premises liability, sexual abuse, and all other personal injury cases depend on complete prompt access of victims to their healthcare records. That critical access is guaranteed by Va. Code Ann. §8.01-413.

§8.01-413(B) requires provision of “records or papers” to a patient: “copies of hospital, nursing facility, physician’s or other health care provider’s records or papers should be furnished within 15 days of receipt of such request to the patient….” Notably, §8.01-413(B) speaks of all “records or papers,” not some amorphous “patient chart”. The latter just is an artificial construct of facilities, insurers and their lawyers; and self-servingly excludes whatever they choose. As Judge Tench observed in a recent medical malpractice case, “Medical records are much more than just the chart hanging there.See, 7/10/07 Licare v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 38.16-23 (emphasis added). §8.01-413(B) is broad, encompassing and not susceptible of such convenient defense abuse.

§8.01-413(C) requires the patient in a pending civil case to issue a Subpoena for his records or papers if the healthcare provider fails to comply with a written request under §8.01-413(B). “[U]pon the failure … to comply with any written request made in accordance with subsection B…, the patient …may cause a subpoena duces tecum to be issued. The subpoena may be issued…in a pending civil case .... *** The subpoena shall be returnable within 20 days of proper service, directing the [healthcare provider] … to produce and furnish copies of the reports and papers to the clerk who shall then make the same available to the patient....” (emphasis added). The letter of §8.01-413(C) mandating enforcement through a “pending” case evinces the intent of companion §8.01-413(B) mandating provision of records and papers during a “pending” case. Also, the Court can award attorney’s fees, court costs and all other expenses for non-compliance. §8.01-413(C).

§8.01-413 is analogous to §2.1-340, et seq., with purpose, motivation and litigation status likewise being irrelevant. Va. Code Ann. §2.1-340, et seq. is the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). The Virginia Supreme Court held “the purpose or motivation behind a [FOIA] request is irrelevant to citizen’s entitlement to requested information.” Associated Tax Servs., Inc. v. Fitzpatrick, 236 Va. 181, 187 (1988). Following Fitzpatrick, Justice Lemons ruled a requestor’s status as medical malpractice plaintiff was irrelevant to and did not disqualify her Virginia FOIA request. Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499, 513-514 (Petersburg 1996). “The broad policy of FOIA mandates that public information be made available to all citizens regardless of their interest in the information,” wrote Justice Lemons. “This Court finds no exception to FOIA that precludes its use where the information sought may become evidence in a pending or contemplated civil suit.” Id. at 514. §8.01-413 is analogous to §2.1-340: it too reflects a broad exception-less policy mandating availability of information. A requestor’s litigation status under §8.01-413 likewise is irrelevant.

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February 7, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.17 – a Lawyer’s Database

Another defense tactic in medical malpractice case is attempting to fabricate a distinction between “paper” and “electronic” records. But Riverside Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006), the landmark case of Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., also upheld the admissibility of such electronic database materials, extensive discovery has exposed paper and electronic as the same, and courts have proved savvy.

Pre-Riverside, in Norfolk Circuit Court, Judge Jacobson found Sentara’s QCCR and prior “Annual Data Summaries and Incident Report excerpts” were not privileged. See, 2/12/01 Garner v. Sentara Order. Judge Taylor then ruled prior incidents as were “substantially similar” may be admissible in evidence on “notice”. See, 2/22/01 Garner v. Sentara Hearing Transcript Excerpt. Cf., Riverside, 272 Va. at 525-528. Sentara’s designated most knowledgeable person (“MKP”), its Risk Manager, testified about its database of all incidents and underlying software program, and produced database print-outs. See, 1/5/01 Garner Deposition of Sentara (Jacque Mitchell) Excerpt with Exhibits 1-6 Excerpts. Charlottesville Circuit Court found the incident “database” of University of Virginia’s Medical Center not privileged. See, Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57, 64-65 (Charlottesville 2003). Newport News Circuit Court found Riverside’s electronic QMS database of prior QCCRs was not privileged and was admissible, see, 2/15/05 Riverside v. Johnson Order; and 2/11/05 Riverside v. Johnson QMS Database; and was upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court.

Post-Riverside, Newport News Circuit twice again found Riverside’s electronic QMS database of incident reports was not privileged in medical malpractice cases. Judge Tench in Licare v. Riverside and Judge Pugh in Shakshober v. Riverside ordered production of all factual information in all Riverside database reports, even though Riverside previously had provided part of its QMS electronic database voluntarily. See, 8/3/07 Licare v. Riverside Order; and 6/24/08 Shakshober v. Riverside Judge’s Order.

Beginning in 1996, Riverside selectively inputted factual patient care information from its incident reports into a computer software program named the Quality Management System (“QMS”), and then destroyed its paper incident reports. See, 2006 Riverside v. Johnson Appeal Appendix Excerpt at 1717-1732. A Risk Management Consultant of The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal (“TVIR”), Riverside’s former long-time medical malpractice insurer, verifies that TVIR created the QMS software program; designed it to have paper incident report data inputted into it; and marketed and distributed it to Riverside and other members of the Virginia Hospitals and Healthcare Association (“VHHA”). See, 12/18/08 Shakshober v. Riverside Deposition of Colleen Lynch at 37.20-38.9 and 44.21-53.1. Since Riverside v. Johnson, Riverside has been using a new paper-less remote data entry “Midas System Manager (“Midas”) software, which now self-servingly tracks and calls “incident reports” as Quality Referrals. See, 7/23/07 Seibert v. Riverside Second Order at 1. Sentara too is a VHHA member and former long-time TVIR insured; and used a software program to input paper incident reports data. See, 1/5/01 Garner v. Sentara Rule 4:5(b)(6) Deposition of Sentara (Jacque Marshall).

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February 6, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 – a Lawyer’s Report

Historically in medical malpractice cases, the defense enjoyed knee-jerk success with convincing Courts to treat so-called “sentinel event reports” differently than other “incident reports”. But that has changed this decade, and stands to erode further in the face of Riverside Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006), the landmark case handled by Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq.

In two of Mr. Waterman’s medical malpractice cases, Courts have ruled that the factual information of sentinel event reports is not protected. First, in Brown v. Riverside, Judge Hubbard found discoverable Riverside’s Sentinel Event Quality Assurance Report, even though the underlying incident occurred one month earlier. See, 1/8/02 Brown v. Riverside Order. Second, in Seibert v. Riverside, Judge Pugh found all factual information in Riverside’s sentinel event and other investigative materials discoverable, even though the underlying incident occurred weeks earlier and Riverside had tried to avoid disclosure with a “quality care” Affidavit. See, 6/11/07 Seibert v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt.

The defense spin is sentinel event reports are unique and sacrosanct. But Mr. Waterman debunked that through the Riverside School of Professional Nursing Director in the Seibert medical malpractice case. It’s director admitted that a “sentinel event” just means a “significant event,” like a death or other serious injury, about which statistics are kept and inter alia taught to students routinely. See¸ 4/20/07 Seibert v. Riverside Rule 4:5(b)(6) Deposition of Riverside (Deborah Sullivan-Yates) Excerpt at 25.14-27.19. Moreover, the fact that facilities are supposed to report sentinel events to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Organizations (“JCAHO”) raises two significant points. First, the requirement of routine reporting eviscerates any ostensible “work product” claim that a true Sentinel Event Report instead was made in anticipation of litigation. Second, facilities hate to report incidents as sentinel events, so often do not – which puts the facility at risk with JCAHO for not reporting as required and its counsel at risk with the Court for not being candid as required. When the initial gambit of false name-dropping as a sentinel event report fails to evoke knee-jerk protection, defense counsel then recharacterizes the same as investigative materials supposedly covered by “work product;” as unsuccessfully was attempted in Seibert.

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February 5, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 – a Lawyer’s Tale

Following the landmark case of Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006), handled by Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., healthcare providers routinely are being forced to provide their incident reports and other investigative materials for medical malpractice cases. Toward stemming the changing judicial tide, some defense counsel are extending themselves with representations.

In the medical malpractice case of Seibert v. Riverside, for example, defense counsel represented to the Court that there was “no sentinel event report” and that only an “incident report” was involved in Brown v. Riverside, see, 6/11/07 Seibert v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 42.24-43.6; that the document withheld in Seibert was a “sentinel event report,” which supposedly was sui generis; id. at 27.13-28.16; and that plaintiff already had all factual information by the incident report. Id. at 29.8-30.4. Further, defense counsel crafted a “quality care” Affidavit, claiming the materials in question were privileged “quality care” documents issued by a protected committee. See, 4/3/07 Seibert v. Riverside Affidavit of Delana Merenda.

But all were inaccurate defense representations to the Court. There was a sentinel event report in Brown, Judge Hubbard found it not privileged, and it was produced –which defense counsel in Seibert knew from being defense counsel in Brown. See, 1/5/02 Brown v. Riverside Order; and 3/8/97 Brown v. Riverside Sentinel Event Quality Assurance Report. Also, there was more factual information not in the Seibert incident report. Compare 7/14/05 Seibert v. Riverside RHS Quality Care Control Report with 6/22/07 Seibert v. Riverside Judge’s Letter with 7/27/05-8/24/05 Redacted Investigative Materials. Additionally, there was only investigative materials and not a true sentinel event report in Seibert. Id. Further, the Seibert investigation issued at the behest of the Risk Manager. See, 7/9/07 Seibert v. Riverside Rule 4:5(b)(6) Deposition of Riverside (Delana Merenda) Excerpt at 1-4 & 32.34-46.21. Deposition of Merenda exposed her Affidavit as a farce. Such misrepresentations in medical malpractice cases should be sanctioned and not condoned by Courts.

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February 4, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.17 Unconstitutionality, Fraud, and Commingling – a Lawyer’s Exception (IV)

Patients have a fundamental right to know the facts of what a commissioned third-party did to his or her body and mind. Patient care inherently is an invasion of privacy interests, the medical malpractice of which denies life, liberty and/or the pursuit of happiness. Because these patient rights are of constitutional proportions, they are inalienable and cannot be abrogated, abridged and/or infringed by statute or common law for the special interest benefit of those hired third-parties. The fact that healthcare providers are paid servants of the patients cuts against any protectionism. §8.01-581.17 is unconstitutional as drafted and as applied. It impacts most the class of patients who need disclosure most. It also denies them procedural and substantive due process.

Claimed “privilege does not permit a litigant to commit a fraud upon a court.” Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 141 (1992). Peterson v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 32 Va. Cir. 294 (Fairfax 1993)(medical malpractice misrepresentation vitiates privilege). Moreover, defense discovery frauds are admissible in evidence. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 274 Va. 581, 589-590 (2007); Owens-Corning, 243 Va. at 141-142. “[W]hen deciding whether a fraud has been committed . . . a controlling factor is ‘whether the misconduct tampers with the judicial machinery and subverts the integrity of the court’.” Id. at 142.

Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57, 59-61 (Charlottesville 2003), another medical malpractice case, exposed the “quality” scheme of the University of Virginia Medical Center (“UVMC”). In 1991, UVMC’s “Incident/Occurrence Reports” summarily were retitled “Quality Reports” and claimed “generated to initiate quality review of Health System processes, practices, and procedures for quality assurance purposes.” Id. at 60. Retitled Reports were routed to various committees ostensibly concerned “primarily with health care improvement activities,” but whose membership included and/or was reported to by “risk management and insurance” and “legal” personnel. Id. at 60-61. UVMC and PLT also maintained “patient databases” and “incident report with medical chart review material in a database format” accessible by the Risk Manager. Id. at 60, 65.

Eppard found “there may be incentives to immediately commingle the creation of an incident report with healthcare evaluation by using § 8.01-581.17 to avoid discovery of damaging information or documents.” Id. at 64. Further, “since the University’s Risk Management staff as well as the PLT staff assigned to the healthcare committees have become part of the healthcare improvement process, the system appears to be designed to wrap large segments of the patient treatment review investigation under a blanket of privilege.” Id. “However, ‘peer review’ should not be used to shield from disclosure medical records not generated initially for peer review objectives.” Id. at 63. Eppard held “commingling” the “healthcare improvement committee” with legal, risk management and insurance interests did not create privilege under § 8.01-581.17. Id. at 64. Eppard ordered discovery of “Case Notes,” i.e., “an incident report with medical chart review material in a database format,” and “Database Notes,” including “medical discussions [that] list investigative facts unearthed by the various parties involved.” Id. at 65.

In a recent medical malpractice case, Judge Tench in Newport News seized upon the old scam: “It seems to be that what the healthcare providers does is they try to couch all this as confidential and say the only thing that the patient gets is the patient’s chart … .” See, 7/10/07 Licare v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 38.16-23 (emphasis added). After in camera review, Judge Tench and redacted and disseminated Riverside records. See, 10/31/07 Licare v. Riverside Judge’s Letter.

Continue reading "Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.17 Unconstitutionality, Fraud, and Commingling – a Lawyer’s Exception (IV)" »

February 3, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17(B) – a Lawyer’s Exception (III)

“The protection provided by § 8.01-581.17 is a qualified privilege similar to the privilege afforded by Rules of Court 4:1(b)(3),” observed Justice Lemons in Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499, 512 (Petersburg 1996)(Lemons, J.)(emphasis added), a medical malpractice case. The limited privilege for certain “committee” communications pertains only “unless a Circuit Court, after a hearing and for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown, orders the disclosure of such proceedings, minutes, records, reports, or communications.” Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 (emphasis added).

For the analogous work-product privilege, determination of “good cause” is “a matter within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only if the action taken was improvident and affected substantial rights.” Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546 (1970). Applying a Rule 4:1(b)(3) “substantial hardship” analysis, the claimed patient “quality care” documents and data should be disclosed under § 8.01-581.17(B), regardless whether they are not discoverable under § 8.01-581.17(C). See, e.g., McMillan, 45 Va. Cir. at 397; McGuin v. Mount Vernon Nursing Ctr. Assocs., L.P., 45 Va. Cir. 386, 386-387 (Fairfax 1998); Benedict, 10 Va. Cir. at 438.

The McGuin medical malpractice case found the incident report was not privileged and, alternatively, Plaintiff had substantial need and no equivalent where the patient had died. 45 Va. Cir. at 386. McMillan is broader, recognizing incident reports as sui generis – a unique source of contemporaneous corroborating factual information – regardless patient and/or nurse availability. “Where, as here, the document constitutes a source of information relevant to the inquiry which is not reasonably discoverable from other sources, it may be ordered produced. * * * From other testimony and argument, it is clear that incident reports are prepared whenever there is a fall, and thus they would constitute the only reasonable source of facts to challenge or corroborate the expert’s contention.” 45 Va. Cir. at 397 (emphasis added). Benedict is to the same effect.

“The injured patient . . . is at such an unfair [dis]advantage: one single individual, sick and weak, pitted against a colossal corporate giant with staff and resources unlimited and personnel schooled in the techniques of avoiding or minimized losses for claimed negligence. Already incapacitated and perhaps further damaged by the incident and at the complete mercy of the personnel from whom she seeks recovery and relief, she is hardly in a position to undertake critical investigation of what happened. * * * * [T]he Court is satisfied that enough substantial need has been shown to require the production of these documents and that obtaining their substantial equivalent could not only not be obtained ‘without undue hardship’ but could probably not be obtained at all. * * * * When the input by one party to an issue in dispute has been so handicapped at the outset because of the conditions of health and the location and environment in which the incidents occurred and when measured against the relative investigative strengths of the parties, natural notions of fair play lean heavily toward opening rather than closing doors that might balance the contest. The potential harm to the Claimant in refusing the discovery sought far outweighs the benefit to the Defendant.” 10 Va. Cir. at 438.

More recently in a medical malpractice case handled by Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., Seibert v. Riverside on June 11, 2007, the court found “good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown,” based on Riverside’s malpractice rendering the patient brain-damaged. See, 6/11/07 Seibert v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 37.7-49.22; and 7/23/07 Seibert v. Riverside Second Order. Seibert was followed and extended in Licare v. Riverside on July 10, 2007, another medical malpractice case of Mr. Waterman, with the court finding good cause “arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown,” based on Riverside’s malpractice killing the patient and, alternatively, on Riverside’s document “retention” policy of destroying its original incident reports. See, 7/10/07 Licare v. Riverside Hearing Transcript Excerpt at 50.20-51.15; and 8/3/07 Licare v. Riverside Order.

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February 2, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17(C) – a Lawyer’s Exception (II)

The last sentence of § 8.01-581.17(C) provides another broad exception that negates any privilege for routine incident reports, electronic incident data, sentinel event reports and investigative materials in medical malpractice cases: “nor shall this section preclude or affect discovery of or production of evidence relating to hospitalization or treatment of any patient in the ordinary course of hospitalization of such patient.” (emphasis added). Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518, 534 (2006), the landmark case of Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., held that a “QCCR, or incident report,” was not privileged because it was “a factual recitation of a fall that occurred during Johnson’s hospitalization and the immediate action taken when Johnson was found on the floor.”

“Any evidence, then, that relates to the treatment of any patient or his hospitalization ... is discoverable, notwithstanding whatever privilege the preceding language may have granted.” Johnson, 9 Va. Cir. at 199. “How can these words be given any other meaning than what they clearly say: this section shall NOT preclude, it mandates, or affect discovery of evidence that relates to a patient's hospitalization or treatment. And this relation is not quantified; any relation to treatment or hospitalization, however infinitesimal, however generalized, is all that is required.” Id. at 199-200 (emphasis in original). An “Incident Report . . . contains facts and evidence relating to the hospitalization or treatment of said patient in the ordinary course of her hospitalization.” Atkinson, 9 Va. Cir. at 23. “Because a hospital may . . . contend that various reports are not [of] a patient’s treatment does not make it so.” Benedict, 10 Va. Cir. at 437.

The Riverside medical malpractice case held that an incident report database excerpt not privileged because it was a “factual description of Johnson’s fall and that of another patient, which according to [the Risk Manager’s testimony], was based on a QCCR. Like the QCCR, the information on this [QMS database] page related to the raw data about the hospitalization and treatment of specific patients.” 272 Va. at 534. Post-Riverside courts similarly find unprotected incident report databases, see, e.g., 6/24/08 Shakahober v. Riverside Order; 8/3/07 Licare v. Riverside Order; 7/23/07 Seibert v. Riverside Second Order; and 2/15/05 Riverside v. Johnson Order; “sentinel event” reports and investigative materials. See, e.g., 8/3/07 Licare v. Riverside Order; 7/23/07 Seibert v. Riverside Second Order; 1/8/02 Brown v. Riverside Order; and 5/5/08 Morel v. Mary Immaculate Order at 3-4.

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February 1, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17(C) – a Lawyer’s Exception (I)

The last sentence of § 8.01-581.17(C) provides a broad exception negating privilege for routine incident reports, electronic incident data, sentinel event reports and investigative materials in medical malpractice cases. “Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any privilege to the hospital medical records kept with respect to any patient in the ordinary course of business of operating a hospital . . . .” (emphasis added). Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518, 534 (2006), landmark case of Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., held Riverside’s “QCCR, or incident report,” was not privileged because it was “written documentation of the circumstances of Johnson’s fall, kept in the normal course of business”. (emphasis added).

Institutions “have tried to classify routine accident or incident reports which are completed by employees on a regular basis as quality assurance documents.” Messerly v. Avante Group, Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26, 27 (Rockingham 1996). But they “do not rise to the level as contemplated by the statute of being quality assurance deliberative documents.” E.g., Bradburn v. Rockingham Mem’l Hosp., 45 Va. Cir. 356, 360 (Rockingham 1998); Huffman v. Beverly California Corp., 42 Va. Cir. 205, 216 (Rockingham 1997); Messerly, 42 Va. Cir. at 27-28. “The QCCRs, QCCRs, or ‘Pink Sheets’ (. . . ‘Incident Reports’) are prepared by staff personnel whenever there is an untoward incident which occurs at the hospital.” Bradburn, 45 Va. Cir. at 358. “They are simply recitations of the accident that occurred, the witnesses who were present, and other objective facts that can be ascertained from the eyewitnesses to the incident.” Id. at 360. They “will likely have been produced by a person with the background and training to know what questions to ask and what information to collect. The person preparing the report is also likely to have access to those people most knowledgeable about the incident at a time the incident is fresh in mind.” Hurdle, 49 Va. Cir. at 329. They are standard in all health care facilities. E.g., Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57, 63 (Charlottesville 2003); Huffman, 42 Va. Cir. at 216; Messerly, 42 Va. Cir. at 26. Cf., Riverside v. Johnson, 272 Va. at 530-531.

Healthcare institutions essentially assert that them self-servingly choosing to keep their patient incident reports, incident report databases, sentinel event reports and/or investigative materials separate from the patient’s chart is self-proving of their privileged status in medical malpractice cases. But “the Incident Report in question falls within the purview of the last sentence of Section 8.01-581.17. It is a hospital medical record kept with respect to the patient . . . in the ordinary course of the business of [Defendant] operating its hospital . . . .” Atkinson, 9 Va. Cir. at 23. Bradburn, 45 Va. Cir. at 360; Huffman, 42 Va. Cir. at 216; Messerly, 42 Va. Cir. at 28. Defendant in Hurdle even conceded the point. 49 Va. Cir. at 329. “Because a hospital may not choose to call a document ‘medical record’ or may contend that various reports are not maintained in the ordinary course of a hospital's business . . . does not make it so.” Benedict, 10 Va. Cir. at 437.

What are, or should be, records kept in the ordinary course of treating a patient or operating a hospital with respect to patients, that is the ultimate question. The ordinary course of a hospital’s function surely includes the prevention of accident or mishaps to those who have been entrusted to its care. Charting the ordinary course of a patient’s treatment would or should require description of events out of the ordinary that relate to a patient’s health and well-being.” Benedict, 10 Va. Cir. at 436 (emphasis added).

“Clearly, injuries to a patient, whether in a hospital or a nursing home, need to be included in the patient’s medical chart and cannot be shielded from discovery by the mere expediency of forwarding these ‘reports’ to a so-called quality control committee.” Messerly, 42 Va. Cir. at 28; Eppard, 62 Va. Cir. at 63; Bradburn, 45 Va. Cir. at 361; Huffman, 45 Va. Cir. at 216. Significantly, incident reports sometimes bear a telltale badge: like other patient medical records kept in the chart, they may be stamped (in the upper right-hand corner) with the patient’s identification plate, medical record number and/or the like.

Continue reading "Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17(C) – a Lawyer’s Exception (I)" »

January 31, 2009

Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 – a Lawyer’s Overview

Toward frustrating medical malpractice claims, hospitals, nursing homes and other healthcare institutions routinely keep “double books” about personal injury incidents – a laundered “patient chart” and other trenchant facility records about the patient. Healthcare institutions routinely withhold the latter from patients, claiming statutory quality-care/peer-review privilege under Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.17. But Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. champions victim patient rights and debunks ostensible privilege in succeeding posts.

The “statutory language [of §8.01-581.17] is clear, unambiguous, and unqualified.” HCA Health Servs. of Virginia, Inc. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 220 (2000). “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction by the court; the plain meaning of the enactment will be given it. Courts must give effect to legislative intent, which must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity.” Id.

8.01-581.17 “provides a privilege in plain language which is limited narrowly to medical staff committees, utilization rule committees, and other committees specified in § 8.01-581.16.” Klarfeld v. Salsbury, 233 Va. 277, 284 (1987)(italics in original)(underlining added). “[T]he scope of § 8.01-581.17 is more limited [than § 8.01-581.16]. Stated differently, § 8.01-581.17 does not include an ‘other entity’ referred to in § 8.01-581.16 which is not a ‘committee’.” Id.

“Ambiguities in the [medmal] statutes should not be extended to enlarge the privilege.” Johnson v. Roanoke Mem’l Hosps., Inc., 9 Va. Cir. 196, 199 (Roanoke 1987). “Any ambiguities in [§ 8.01-581.17] must be strictly construed for, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, ‘exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth’. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).” Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275, 277 (Fairfax 1990). Recently writing for the Virginia Supreme Court, Justice Lemons reiterated that a statute (such as §8.01-581.17) “in derogation of the common law… must be ‘strictly construed and not…enlarged in [its] operation by construction beyond [its] express terms’.” Univ. of Va. Health Servs. Found. v. Morris, 275 Va. 319 (2008)(Lemons, J.)(denying immunity to a hospital healthcare provider in the context of medical malpractice).

Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006), a landmark medical malpractice case of Mr. Waterman, held “communications … provided to” covered committees were “not privileged”; “factual information of patient care” is not confidential or privileged; and use of factual patient care information in the peer review or quality care committee process does not render it privileged. “These limitations on the application of the privilege are consistent with preserving the confidentiality of the quality review process while allowing disclosure of relevant information regarding specific patient care and treatment. *** It is the deliberative process and the conclusions reached through that process that the General Assembly sought to protect. *** The deliberative process involving evaluation of patient safety conditions and the design of initiatives to improve the health care system both necessarily begin with factual information of patient care incidents occurring within the health care facility. The use of this factual information in some way in the peer review or quality care committee process alone is insufficient to automatically cloak such information with the protection of no-disclosure. Factual patient care information that does not contain or reflect any committee discussion or action by the committee reviewing the information is not the type of information that must ‘necessarily be confidential’ in order to allow participation in the peer or quality assurance review process. Rather such information is the type, contemplated by Subsection (C) of Code §8.01-581.17, which the General Assembly has specifically instructed should not be brought within the scope of those items entitled to the privilege under any other part of the section. Applying these principles, we conclude that the documents at issue here are of the nature of those described in Code §8.01-581.17(C) and are not privileged.” 272 Va. at 532-533 (emphasis added). Cf., Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499, 508 (Petersburg 1996)(Lemons, J.).

Continue reading "Medical Malpractice: Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 – a Lawyer’s Overview" »

January 28, 2009

Medical Malpractice Wrongful Death Reduction – a Lawyer’s Checklist

Recently, wrongful deaths were reduced by almost 50% and untoward personal injuries were reduced by over 35% by a 19-item non-cardiac surgical safety checklist. The New England Journal of Medicine reported this on January 29, 2009, by article, “A Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbility and Mortality in a Global Population.”

During October 2007-September 2008, roughly 4,000 patients in 8 urban hospitals worldwide participated in the World Health Organization’s Safe Surgery Saves Lives program. The study findings proved its premised, thereby indicating prevalent medical malpractice: “Surgical complications are common and often preventable.”

The checklist principally consists of verifying patient identity, allergies and blood type; surgical site, procedure, and critical events; and access to blood, imaging, and certain instrumentalities. Verification occurs before anesthesia induction, before skin incision, and before leaving the operating room.

The implication is that many wrongful deaths and personal injuries are caused by medical malpractice in non-cardiac surgery due to healthcare providers neglecting simple routine verification procedures. Fortunately, these serious untoward consequences are readily avoidable.

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January 13, 2009

Virginia Traumatic Brain Injuries – a Lawyer’s Non-Malingerer

The defense may dispute mild and even moderate traumatic brain injury, particularly where neuroimaging is inconclusive. The defense opportunistically may contest the fact of brain injury and, alternatively, may assert that the victim is malingering.

The victim’s lawyer must protect his brain injury client against any such unfounded ploy with motions in limine, objections at trial, etc. As gatekeeper, Virginia Courts must be vigilant against introduction of malingering testimony, which is highly prejudicial and variously inadmissible.

Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not ruled substantively on malingering testimony, many of its opinions provide ample general guidance such evidence. For example, the defense bears the burden of proving that such testimony is founded on proper expert qualifications, assists the jury, does not invade the jury’s province, does not violate physician-patient confidentiality, is not speculative, is not missing variables, does not include hearsay, is based on scientifically reliable methods, is to the appropriate degree of certainty, is not cumulative, is more probative than prejudicial, etc.

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January 3, 2009

Virginia Patient Falls – a Lawyer’s Expert Authority

On November 27, 2008, The Daily Press featured authority about patient falls in Virginia. That expert authority on medical malpractice was introduced by Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., who has obtained a record verdict and record settlements in Virginia patient fall cases. Per The Daily Press, over 20 years, published reliable expert authority has emphasized the following.

“A review of fall literature confirms that various researchers have identified risk factors (measurable patient characteristics, medical or nursing diagnoses) that have a potential to predict falls in elderly population, thus suggesting preventability. Falls are one of the most common reasons that nurses…and hospitals are sued for medical negligence. Many falls are predictable and should not be considered to be an expected sequela of the aging process. Hospitalization can pose a major risk for older persons….”

“Falls are a common problem and nurse should be aware of patients who many fall. Various safety precautions can be taken to prevent falls.”

“Older adults…are a high-risk group for falls with resulting injuries. More aggressive measures seemed necessary to prevent further patient falls. These measures included additional patient safely devices [such as ‘bed alert’ systems], more stringent staff education in patient fall prevention, and the development of a written protocol of nursing intervention levels….”

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January 2, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice Cases – a Lawyer’s $2,600,000.00 Patient Falls

On December 26, 2008, The Daily Press featured medical malpractice cases of Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq., including three patient fall cases settled for $2,600,000.00 in 2008. The article is “Attorney fights to get the facts on patient care in hospitals,” subtitled “He contends most institutions keep ‘double books’ that can conceal details about injuries”.

It covers Mr. Waterman’s landmark medical malpractice case decided by the Virginia Supreme Court, Riverside Hospital, Inc v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006) . That decision mandated healthcare institutions provide patients their factual medical records, including particularly incident reports and electronic databases. But Riverside and other institutions continue to resist Johnson and attempt to overturn it legislatively through their activist trade association, Virginia Hospitals & Healthcare Association. To date, however, their attempts to “couch” factual patient medical records as confidential have been unsuccessful in Newport News Circuit Court. The article recounted Mr. Waterman’s courtroom successes in compelling healthcare institutions, including most notably a facility that withheld over 700 pages of factual patient care records.

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January 1, 2009

Virginia Medical Malpractice - a Lawyer's Publication (13 of 13)

This is the last of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

IV. PP&P LEGISLATION

Section 8.01-581.17 was intended to balance the legitimate competing societal interests of disclosure to victim patients and of confidentiality for healthcare providers. That delicate balance is struck by rendering the actual deliberative process of covered committees privileged, while otherwise upholding patient access.

In the discrete context of PP&P, the analysis and debate, the drafting and revision, etc. of covered committees are protected. However, PP&P finally adopted for use by healthcare providers do not enjoy any protection.

An amendment to §8.01-581.17 should add new language to the following effect: “No policy, procedure, protocol or like private rule that has been adopted for use and/or used in fact by a healthcare provider shall be privileged; provided, however, that preliminary deliberation thereon and/or drafting thereof by a committee protected under §8.01-581.16 shall be privileged, unless a circuit court, after a hearing and for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown, orders their disclosure.” That is necessary and appropriate to clarify the pertinent Virginia law and to curb abuse of it.

Otherwise, privilege abuse will continue until a case finally percolates to the Supreme Court of Virginia and becomes the unquestioned law of the Commonwealth. When that landmark opinion is handed down, which likely will be sooner than later, healthcare providers again will prevail on the General Assembly for more protectionist legislation. As most recently with Riverside, the healthcare hew and cry will be that the highest court’s new decision is a maverick one from left field that radically changes existing law – when in fact, as elucidated by this article, it really just will exemplify the current majority rule of the numerous lower courts that reflects the gradual evolution of the law over decades. So it is time now to see and call the jurisprudence for what it actually is and, concomitantly, to legislate accurately based on the empirics and not on the hysterics.

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December 31, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice - a Lawyer's Publication (12 of 13)

This is 12 of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

G. PP&P are admissible as “notice” evidence.

PP&P are admissible to show “notice”. Over half a century ago, in New Bayshore Corp. v. Lewis, the Virginia Supreme Court pronounced the defendant’s safety rules and instructions admitted into evidence “indicate that defendant was aware of the potential dangers involved.” A pending punitive damages claim in a medical malpractice case, for example, inherently imports proof of defendant’s prior knowledge and awareness. That means a patient seeking punitive damages can – indeed, must – introduce evidence of defendant’s notice. Clearly healthcare providers have notice if pertinent PP&P were in use.

H. PP&P may be admissible on other evidentiary grounds.

The foregoing bases for admission of PP&P in evidence is not meant to be exhaustive. They merely are some examples. The big legal picture is that there really are many independent grounds for PP&P being admitted in evidence; a patient never should not get tripped up on threshold point of discoverability.

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December 30, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice - a Lawyer's Publication (11 of 13)

This is 11 of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

F. PP&P are admissible as “standard of care” evidence.

“Strong and appealing argument can be made that [private] rules should be admitted as a help to the jury in determining such a nebulous concept as a standard of care,” progressively observed Judge Coulter in 1984. Further, he noted that a “manual [that] contained safety rules of a private nature [was] referred to with apparent approval in Broaddus” by the Virginia Supreme Court.

PP&P alone do not make a prima facie case. But if relied upon by an expert, they are admissible on SOC. If an expert testifies to establish the SOC, PP&P may be introduced as exemplification of that standard (and for impeachment of the defense and its experts on the same). That is analytically sound: the pivotal expert testimony elevates PP&P beyond mere bare “private rules” and sufficiently establishes them as some concrete examples of the standard of care fixed by the expert’s opinion as a predicate. “Patient care standards . . . do not ultimately define the defendant’s duty. * * * The [hospital’s] standards, along with learned treatises and expert witnesses, simply represent some concrete evidence of that duty and assist the trier of fact in determining the relevant standard of care. * * * Invariably, a defendant hospital’s employees admit under oath that knowledge of relevant standards and substantial compliance with them is a basic part of their orientations training and a required part of their job description.”

The Virginia Supreme Court appropriately exercised judicial restraint on the issue in Riverside. There were narrower grounds on which to decide the appeal, and the aforesaid evidentiary foundation expressly had not been laid by the patient. Purposely in Riverside, the materials in question reviewed by the patient’s expert only were “consulted in formulating her opinion on the standard of care”. That clearly was permissible, since by statute the materials “relied upon [by any expert witness]… need not be admissible in evidence”.

In Bly v. Rhoades, the Virginia Supreme Court found the issue of admissibility of hospital rules moot because the patient had not introduced sufficient SOC expert testimony for a prima facie case. But the Court in Bly observed anyway that the trial court’s exclusion was only “arguably . . . supported by precedent [of] Godsey:” Hence “Bly . . . implies that [hospital rules] may provide some evidence of the standard of care,” pronounced Judge Annunziata. Further, when sitting on the Circuit Court in 1997, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lemons in Stevens v. Hosp. Auth. For the City of Petersburg declared that a hospital’s “private rules…may be evidence as to the appropriate standard of care to be provided by the defendants [and] offer a basis for claims of ordinary and gross negligence,” citing Godsey and Pullen as authority. “See also Graves v. Gulmatico, No. CA 83-0679-R (E.D. Va. Sept 4, 1984)(Judge D. Dorch Warriner ruled that the Hospital and Medical Staff Bylaws were not only admissible exhibits in a case against a physician, but represented some of the best evidence of the applicable standard of care).” Finally, in Garner v. Sentara Norfolk Gen. Hosp. in 2001, Judge Taylor ruled that PP&P were admissible by the patient if the defense expert relied on them for SOC.

Virginia Hospitals & Healthcare Association (“VHHA”) is the activist trade association whose self-proclaimed “core mission” is influencing legislation, and most recently was behind 2007 H.B. 3090 and companion 2008 H.B. 382 to overturn Riverside legislatively. Cursory review of VHHA’s website shows that its roughly 100 institutional members are dominated by a small number of giant healthcare systems: Bon Secours, Sentara, INOVA, Carillion, and Riverside. Thus, especially PP&P from representative members of those Virginia healthcare Goliaths genuinely do evince the SOC prevailing in the Commonwealth of Virginia as a matter of fact, so definitely should not be excluded.

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December 29, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (10 of 13)

This is 10 of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

D. PP&P are admissible as “vicarious liability” evidence.

In Christian v. Loudoun Hosp. Ctr., the patient sought healthcare providers to identify “each and every rule, regulation, by-law, or other document promulgated by any hospital, association, public authority, licensing authority or other government or private organization which was applicable to or descriptive of the standard of care owed by Karen Asbury, RN or any of your other employees and/or agents in the provision of healthcare to the plaintiff,” and to provide copies of the same. Defendants in Christian unsuccessfully objected that the responsive “material is irrelevant, unlikely to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, and otherwise protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney-work product doctrine and Virginia Code § 8.01-581.17.”

The defense asserted that Christian was controlled by Levin, even though Levin had nothing to do with PP&P and was placed its proper context by Riverside. As a threshold matter, the court in Christian rejected the amorphous jingoistic defense mantra that PP&P was “confidential” for “safety and quality”. Judge Horne declared, “It has nothing to do with the quality of healthcare providers.”

The court in Christian then rejected the stock defense assertion of irrelevance. Judge Horne questioned the defense rhetorically, “If you don’t have access to those, how are you going to be able to prove any agency relationship? Control is the central feature of that.” Based on “claims of vicarious liability” for the agency nurse, PP&P were held “relevant to issues of employment, agency and control”. This evolution in judicial thinking on PP&P by Judge Horne from his initial opinion in Mangano v. Kavanaugh in 1993 to his recent Bench comments and Order in Christian in 2006 is a noteworthy contribution to the tidal wave of judicial scrutiny that continues to swamp boatloads of unsupportable defense buzzwords and misrepresentations.

Christian also is buttressed by Broaddus v. Standard Drug Co., a 1971 Virginia Supreme Court opinion. In Broaddus, the private written manual and oral instructions of a contractor detective agency were admitted on the issue of whether the individual tortfeasor was acting within the scope of employment for purposes of importing vicarious liability.

E. PP&P are admissible as “sovereign immunity” evidence.

The Virginia Supreme Court in James v. Jane and progeny mandated a four-part test of sovereign immunity in medical malpractice cases. In Houchens v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., the court found that “the extent to which the [defendant] nurses were or were not obligated to abide by standing orders, protocols, or manuals is relevant to the determination of sovereign immunity.” Since employee discretion and employer control and direction were elements of the four-part sovereign immunity test, the court ordered PP&P production at the discovery hearing and reserved ruling on ultimate admissibility for trial.

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December 28, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (9 of 13)

This is nine of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

C. PP&P are admissible as “habit” and/or “routine practice” evidence.

In 2000, healthcare interest lobbying secured passage of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-397.1, providing for the admissibility of habit or routine practice evidence in medical malpractice and other civil proceedings.

Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eye witnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. Evidence of prior conduct may be relevant to rebut evidence of habit or routine practice.

“A ‘habit’ is a person’s regular response to repeated specific situations. A ‘routine practice’ is a regular course of conduct of a group of persons or an organization in response to repeated specific situations.”

Frequently defendant and complicit healthcare providers conveniently profess a lack of recollection of the specific malpractice-related conduct in question. Such claimed amnesia entitles them to testify self-servingly about their supposed personal habit and/or organization’s routine practice, i.e., to attest generally to having done the right thing under the circumstances. Thus, PP&P of the organization and/or of the individual stand as a singular yardstick by which to measure claimed habit and/or routine practice, necessarily making them relevant, material and even crucial evidence.

In Williamson v. Columbia/HCA John Randolph, Inc., the patient emphasized that PP&P was the “best evidence” of routine practice and habit under §8.01-397.1. The court concurred: “As far as a routine practice of an organization, now you can’t get that unless you have some record like [PP&P].”

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December 27, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (8 of 13)

This is eight of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

B. The Godsey-Pullen “private rules” doctrine does not apply to PP&P.

Even if the archaic “private rules” doctrine is not abrogated, it is inapplicable to PP&P on several independent grounds. First, Godsey-Pullen applies only to a “litigant who is not a party to such rules,” and plaintiff patients and defendant healthcare providers qualify as parties to PP&P. Patients undeniably are the intended third-party beneficiaries of PP&P. “Patients are also parties to these [rules] as members of the public represented by government agencies which require and enforce health care standards for ‘the public welfare’.” Healthcare providers obviously are parties to the rules they promulgated.

Second, Godsey and Pullen are distinguishable on the facts. In Godsey, a street car accident victim introduced the company’s operation rules to fix the standard of duty to him. Similarly, in Pullen, a victim motorist introduced highway department maintenance guideline excerpts to fix the standard of duty. Neither Godsey nor Pullen involved an expert.

Hence plaintiffs in both Godsey and Pullen attempted to set the standard for negligence simply by bare introduction of the private rules alone. Specifically, they did not use any expert to establish the legal standard as an evidentiary foundation to introducing the private rules. Conversely, under Virginia’s Medical Malpractice Act, medical malpractice victims presumptively must rely upon expert testimony to establish the legal standard (and attest to the private rules as evidentiary and/or foundational examples). Thus, Godsey and Pullen are limited narrowly to similar fact patterns, which inherently are not characteristic of medical malpractice cases.

Third, the Godsey finding that there was “no evidence of any custom based upon [the particular private rules]” likewise is distinguishable too. Judge Annunziata cogently observed in 1990 that healthcare PP&P “materials . . . may properly be seen as reflecting widely-adopted standards established or required by third-party entities, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (“JCAHO”).” Therefore, she explained, “to the extent the hospital’s policies and protocols are reflective of industry custom and even statewide practices, they may be distinguished from the purely private rules held inadmissible by the Supreme Court in Pullen.”

Fourth, recently in Riverside, the Virginia Supreme Court distinguished rather than embraced Godsey-Pullen. “In this case, the evidence of the staff orientation instruction and nursing curriculum… were not hospital policies or procedures of the type involved in Godsey and Pullen.” Thus, Riverside suggests that the Virginia Supreme Court at worst is applying Godsey-Pullen narrowly and at best is distancing from it altogether.

Continue reading "Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (8 of 13)" »

December 26, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (7 of 13)

This is seven of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

III. PP&P ADMISSIBILITY

Like Federal Courts and other states, the Virginia Supreme Court continues to embrace a liberal test for admissibility of evidence. “Generally, a litigant is entitled to introduce all competent, material, and relevant evidence that tends to prove or disprove any material issue in the case, unless that evidence violates a specific rule of admissibility.” Relevance in particular has been defined broadly. “Every fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue is relevant.”

In opposing admissibility (and thereby indirectly discoverability), healthcare defendants invariably call upon the dynamic duo of Pullen v. Nickens and Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Godsey to presume their supposed “private rules” inadmissible. But Godsey-Pullen is an anachronism that is overgeneralized and misapplied. Healthcare PP&P actually are admissible for numerous reasons.

A. Godsey-Pullen should be overturned as an erroneous minority anachronism.

Pullen reaffirmed the World War I ruling of Godsey. But Godsey-Pullen was criticized immediately: “The reasons and rationale that supported the rule of inadmissibility in 1915, the year that Godsey was decided, have been somewhat blunted in recent years.”

“[O]ne of the arguments in support of the Godsey decision of 1915 was the expressed observation that the majority rule then in vogue in the nation prohibited the introduction of a company’s private rules. Since then, however, the climate has changed substantially.” By the 1980s alone, approximately three-quarters of the nation already had abandoned that old rule.

Another Godsey-Pullen argument – that the doctrine supposedly was necessary to encourage private rules – is dubious, particularly in the context of the current sophisticated regulated healthcare industry. The fact is that modern healthcare is steeped in rulemaking by and through numerous professional entities, wholly separate and apart from whether and to what extent Virginia continues archaically to subscribe to the minority “private rules” doctrine. Moreover, Virginia healthcare providers would expose themselves to more, not less, liability if they ever recklessly abandoned all private rules and practiced ad hoc.

The doctrine that fit in the nostalgic twilight of the horse and buggy almost a century ago – and that long since has been rejected as unsuitable by the overwhelming majority of states – now is flagrant error in the modern era of big institutional healthcare. The Virginia Supreme Court recently applying a modern “commercial business” realities analysis to limit the doctrine of “charitable immunity” and to deny it to big healthcare is consistent with rejection or at least amelioration of the Godsey-Pullen legal anachronism in the healthcare context.

Reversal of Godsey-Pullen naturally involves the doctrine of stare decisis. But in Oraee v. Breeding, a 2005 medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Virginia declared that it should not “perpetuate a mistake” based on that doctrine: “upon no sound principle do we feel at liberty to perpetuate an error into which either our predecessors or ourselves may have inadvertently fallen, merely upon the ground of such erroneous decision having been previously rendered.”

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December 25, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (6 of 13)

This is six of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

II. PP&P ABUSE

As indicated, healthcare defendants typically deny patients their PP&P on claims of privilege, inadmissibility and irrelevance. Despite the claimed irrelevance to the medical malpractice suit, however, healthcare defendants still privately provide their PP&P to their litigation experts and even to some fact witnesses to influence them by the same.

Garner v. Sentara Norfolk Gen. Hosp. in 2001 examplifies the modus operandi of healthcare providers for floating their PP&P litigation dichotomy, as well as the ends to which the defense resorts to protect it. Patient requested, Defendant objected to producing, and Plaintiff moved to compel “standards, guidelines, policies and procedures”; and the matter was deferred to the trial judge by the discovery duty judge.

Plaintiff then subpoenaed and deposed Defendants’ lead standard of care expert, Nurse Cox. Nurse Cox acknowledged defense counsel having given her Sentara’s fall prevention policy to review in conjunction with the patient’s chart and pleadings. But in Garner, defense counsel affirmatively subverted the healthcare providers’ expert responding to the patient’s deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum for PP&P in her possession: he had her turn over Sentara’s policy to him immediately before her deposition, and then refused to provide it to the patient despite still having it at hand.

Nurse Cox testified that Sentara’s policy she reviewed set the standard of care (“SOC”); that she believed the defendant nurse had fulfilled the policy and, thereby, met the SOC; and that if the nurse did not do everything stated in the policy, she fell below the SOC. Nurse Cox testified further vis-à-vis the prevailing SOC that she had not reviewed her own hospital’s policy in quite a while, and that she had not been provided and was not familiar with any other hospital’s policy.

Thus, Garner exposes the defense effectively introducing healthcare PP&P, claiming full compliance therewith, and asserting SOC met orally; and by continually denying patient access to any written PP&P, precluding any impeachment or cross-examination (such as about defense counsel and/or expert misstating, leaving out and/or minsunderstanding something). That “do as I say, not as I do” defense dichotomy not only leaves the patient unfairly to fight the instant case with one arm tied behind back, but also keeps all patients in the dark generally and precludes their aggregation, exchange and comparison of PP&P, i.e., precludes patients from documenting by PP&P what prevails statewide – from examplifying SOC through multiple PP&P.

Based on Nurse Cox’s deposition in Garner, the patient noticed her motion to compel production of PP&P and, alternatively, moved in limine to exclude defendants “making any oral reference to the hospital’s policy and/or protocol, let alone claiming compliance with the same and meeting the standard thereby”. At hearing, Judge Taylor held that Sentara’s PP&P were discoverable and, if Nurse Cox relied on them for SOC (as she did), that PP&P were admissible too. The patient next named Nurse Cox as a potential witness and served a trial subpoena, which the defense sought to avoid by moving to quash. Shortly thereafter, Garner was resolved and dismissed.

Continue reading "Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (6 of 13)" »

December 24, 2008

Virginia Medical Malpractice – a Lawyer’s Publication (5 of 13)

This is five of 13 reprinting Mr. Waterman’s leading medical malpractice article, “Healthcare Policies, Procedures & Protocols: Discoverability, Abuse, Admissibility & Legislation,” featured in VTLA’s The Journal for Spring, 2008.

C. “Good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances” trumps privilege.

“Section 8.01-581.17 allows discovery ‘for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown’,” observed Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lemons in Stevens v. Lemmie in 1996. Hence, explained Justice Lemons, § 8.01-581.17 provides only a “qualified privilege similar to the privilege afforded by Rules of Court 4:1(b)(3).” For the analogous work-p